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 On 1 January 2018, the new Belgian Gender Recognition Act (GRA) 1 entered 
into force. % e Act fundamentally reformed the administrative procedure 
for legal gender recognition by abolishing all psycho-medical requirements. By 
doing so, Belgium joined a small number of countries worldwide that introduced 
an administrative procedure for the recognition of the gender identity of trans 
persons 2 based on self-identi& cation, which consists of States such as Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal and Uruguay. % is chapter will analyse 
the new GRA in light of current standards of international human rights law 
concerning gender identity and the rights of trans persons. 3 In this regard, it 
aims to establish whether the new Act could be considered as the keystone to the 
protection of trans rights in Belgium, or is only one step on a longer road to full 
gender inclusivity in Belgian law. In June 2019, the Belgian Constitutional Court 
delivered a judgment in which it addressed the conformity of parts of the GRA 
with the Belgian Constitution. 4 % e chapter will naturally fully take into account 
the Court ’ s & ndings in evaluating the Act. 
 % is chapter ’ s focus on the legal recognition of a trans person ’ s self-de& ned 
gender identity does not mean that legal gender recognition is or should 
be the only point of attention for the protection of the human rights of trans 
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 5  J.T.  Theilen ,  ‘ Pre-Existing Rights and Future Articulations. Temporal Rhetoric in the 
Struggle for Trans Rights ’ in  A.  Von Arnauld ,  K.  Odendahl and  M.  Susi (eds.),   e 
Cambridge Handbook on New Human Rights: Recognition, Novelty, Rhetoric ,  Cambridge 
University Press ,  Cambridge  2020 . See also  E.  Bribosia and  I. Rorive ,  ‘ Human rights 
integration in action: making equality law work for trans people in Belgium ’ in  E.  Brems (ed.), 
 Fragmentation and Integration in Human Rights Law: Users ’ Perspectives ,  Edward Elgar 
Publishers ,  Cheltenham  2018 , p. 114. 
 6  E.  Bribosia and  I.  Rorive ,  ‘ Human rights integration in action: making equality law work 
for trans people in Belgium ’ in  E.  Brems (ed.),  Fragmentation and Integration in Human 
Rights Law: Users ’ Perspectives ,  Edward Elgar Publishers ,  Cheltenham  2018 , pp. 112 – 113. See 
for instance Ilga World,  ‘ State-Sponsored Homophobia ’  < https://ilga.org/downloads/ILGA_
State_Sponsored_Homophobia_2019.pdf > . 
 7  J.T.  Theilen ,  ‘ Pre-Existing Rights and Future Articulations. Temporal Rhetoric in the Struggle 
for Trans Rights ’ in  A.  Von Arnauld ,  K.  Odendahl and  M.  Susi (eds.),   e Cambridge 
Handbook on New Human Rights: Recognition, Novelty, Rhetoric ,  Cambridge University Press , 
 Cambridge  2020 . 
 8  A.  S ø rlie ,  ‘ Legal Gender Meets Reality: A Socio-Legal Children ’ s Perspective ’ in  A.  Hellum (ed.), 
 Human Rights, Sexual Orientation, and Gender Identity ,  Routledge ,  London  2017 , 
p.  103 . 
persons. Indeed, it is important not to forget that the legal protection of trans 
persons without broader societal acceptance constitutes only a partial solution 
to transphobia at large. 5 All over the world, alarming rates of violence and 
discrimination of transgender persons are reported. 6 Nevertheless, as % eilen 
argues, it might be assumed that the legal institutionalisation of gender identity 
rights is a worthwhile means to bring about societal changes. 7 A' er all, as S ø rlie 
states  ‘ if the law does not exclude certain identities or create otherness, this may 
change attitudes in society and may improve [ … ] self-esteem, eventually opening 
the way to full self-realisation for gender non-conforming people in accordance 
with their right to respect for their private life and non-discrimination ’. 8 
 % e following sections will analyse the Belgian 2017 GRA. % e Act will & rst 
be contextualised within the general Belgian sex/gender registration framework 
( Section 1 ). It will then be evaluated ( Section 2 ) in light of current international 
human rights standards, focussing on the (scope of the) recognition of gender 
self-determination ( Section 2.1 ), the depathologisation of trans persons 
( Section 2.2 ), the lingering cisnormativity in law and con< ation between sex 
and gender identity ( Section 2.3 ), and the binary normativity of Belgian law 
( Section 2.4 ). 
 1. THE LEGAL RECOGNITION OF GENDER IDENTITY 
 1.1. DEFINITION 
 Essentially, the concept of the legal recognition of a person ’ s gender identity, 
or simply  ‘ legal gender recognition ’, refers to the judicial or administrative 
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 9  See in this regard also  J.T.  Theilen ,  ‘ % e Long Road to Recognition: Transgender Rights 
and Transgender Reality in Europe ’ in  G.  Schreiber (ed.),  Transsexualit ä t in  eologie und 
Neurowissenscha# en. Ergebnisse, Kontroversen, Perspektiven ,  De Gruyter ,  Berlin  2016 , p. 375. 
 10  See in this regard also  M.  van den Brink ,  ‘ “ % e Legitimate Aim of Harmonising Body and 
Soul ” . Changing Legal Gender: Family Life and Human Rights ’ in  K.  Boele-Woelki and 
 A.  Fuchs (eds.),  Same-Sex Relationships and Beyond. Gender Matters in the EU ,  Intersentia , 
 Cambridge  2017 , p. 243. 
 11  F.R.  Ammaturo ,  European Sexual Citizenship. Human Rights, Bodies and Identities ,  Palgrave , 
 London  2017 , p. 69. 
 12  Since the o;  cial framework of registration is characterised by a con< ation between sex and 
gender identity (see  infra ), the term sex/gender registration will sometimes be used in this 
chapter. % e term refers to the entire o;  cial registration system, without specifying whether 
it actually concerns  ‘ sex ’ registration or  ‘ gender identity ’ registration. 
possibility that the law o ers to (trans) persons to seek congruence between 
their gender identity and their o;  cial sex marker, as assigned and registered by 
the State. 9 In other words, on the basis of legal gender recognition , a person is 
able to have their registered sex amended in light of their personal experience 
of gender. In this regard, most States require some conditions, ranging from 
psycho-medical requirements such as an expert assessment/diagnosis , full 
gender a;  rming treatment and/or compulsory sterility , to age requirements, to 
mandatory divorce . 10 Due to the invasive medical requirements, legal gender 
recognition is o' en preserved for transsexual persons, or trans persons who are 
willing to undergo gender a;  rming treatment, although they do not desire to 
do so. % is is referred to by Ammaturo as  ‘ the denial of legal subjectivity to the 
broader category of transgender persons ’. 11 
 % e next section will & rst establish the Belgian legal framework regarding 
o;  cial sex registration at birth and legal gender recognition since the entry into 
force of the 2017 GRA. % is demarcation is important, considering the paradigm 
shi'  in Belgian law that was introduced by the GRA. However, since this 
paradigm shi'  is essentially linked to the  – from a human rights perspective  – 
problematic nature of the 2007 Act on Transsexuality, it is also necessary to 
concisely establish the administrative procedure for legal gender recognition 
that was introduced by this latter Act. 
 1.2. SEX/GENDER 12 REGISTRATION IN BELGIAN LAW 
 1.2.1. Sex Registration at Birth 
 Since legal gender recognition refers to the amendment of a person ’ s originally 
assigned sex, it is necessary to & rst elaborate on the basic provisions regarding 
the o;  cial sex registration at birth, which can be found in the Belgian Civil 
Code. On the basis of Article 43, a child ’ s birth must be declared to the civil 
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 13  As will be explained below, the Constitutional Court suggested in its 2019 judgment on the 
GRA that the federal legislature could introduce one or more non-binary categories for sex 
registration at birth, in order to implement the judgment ’ s & ndings. 
 14  E.  Van Royen ,  ‘ De vermelding van het geslacht in de geboorteakte [% e indication of sex in 
the birth certi& cate] ’ in  P.  Senaeve and  K.  Uytterhoeven (eds.),  De rechtspositie van de 
transseksueel [  e legal status of the transsexual] ,  Intersentia ,  Antwerp  2008 , p. 273. 
 15  K.  Uytterhoeven ,  ‘ Het onderscheid tussen de vorderingen van staat en de vorderingen tot 
verbetering van een akte van de burgerlijke stand m.b.t. interseksuelen en transseksuelen 
[% e distinction between the claims concerning civil status and the claims to correct a civil 
status certi& cate, with regard to intersexuals and transsexuals] ’ ( 2000 )  TBBR (Tijdschri#  voor 
Belgisch Burgerlijk Recht) ,  46 . 
 16  T.  Balthazar ,  ‘ Transseksualiteit in het Belgisch recht [Transsexuality in Belgian law] ’ in 
 G.  T ’ sjoen ,  M.  Van Trotsenburg and  L.  Gijs (eds.),  Transgenderzorg [Transgender care] , 
 Acco ,  Leuven  2013 , p.  243 . 
 17  C.  Simon ,  ‘ Au-del à du binaire: penser le genre, la loi et le droit des personnes transgenres en 
Belgique ’ ( 2016 )  28  Canadian Journal of Women and the Law ,  521 , 530. 
 18  See in this regard also  E.  Bribosia and  I.  Rorive ,  ‘ Human rights integration in action: 
making equality law work for trans people in Belgium ’ in  E.  Brems (ed.),  Fragmentation 
and Integration in Human Rights Law: Users ’ Perspectives ,  Edward Elgar Publishers , 
 Cheltenham  2018 , p. 119. 
 19  Act of 10 May 2007 on Transsexuality,  BG 11 July 2007. 
registrar within & ' een days a' er birth. On the basis of Article 43, paragraph 4 
the registrar dra' s the birth certi& cate without delay. Article 44 of the Civil Code 
includes a person ’ s sex within the compulsory information that is incorporated in 
every person ’ s birth certi& cate. However, it does not specify the options that are 
available to the registrar. According to the literature, the registrar can presently 13 
only choose between the binary  ‘ male ’ / ’ female ’, given its self-evidence in the 
Belgian legal order. 14 % e registrar bases the registration generally on a medical 
declaration made by the gynaecologist or midwife, who focus in practice on the 
newborn ’ s external genitalia. 15 
 1.2.2.   e 2007 Act on Transsexuality 
 Although transsexual persons in Belgium have been able to seek legal gender 
recognition through judicial procedures since the 1960s, changing one ’ s 
assigned legal sex a' er gender a;  rming therapy was very o' en based on the 
courage of individual transsexual persons and creative judges. 16 % e outcome 
could be very uncertain, since the issue related to concepts that could induce 
subjective convictions with the judge at hand, which could be unfavourable to 
the individual concerned. 17 Taking into account this legal uncertainty, 18 the 
burdensome procedure for the individual, developments in several European and 
other States, and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR ), 
the Belgian federal Parliament adopted the Act on Transsexuality in 2007, which 
introduced an administrative procedure for legal gender recognition in the Civil 
Code. 19 
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 20  Note that the requirement of sterility before the entry into force of the 2007 Act on 
Transsexuality was not necessarily based on the jurisprudence, but on treatment protocols 
used by medical gender teams. According to the author of the 2007 Act, sterility is inherent 
to legal recognition, since  ‘ “ natural laws ” need to be respected ’ . See  Parl.Doc. Chamber of 
representatives, 51-0903/006, 59. See in this regard also  M.  van den Brink ,  ‘ “ % e Legitimate 
Aim of Harmonising Body and Soul ” . Changing Legal Gender: Family Life and Human 
Rights ’ in  K.  Boele-Woelki and  A.  Fuchs (eds.),  Same-Sex Relationships and Beyond. 
Gender Matters in the EU ,  Intersentia ,  Cambridge  2017 , p.  244 . 
 21  To the author ’ s knowledge, no successful appeal was ever launched. 
 22  Parl.Doc. Senate, 3-1794/5. 
 23  Ibid. See also Art. M2, para. 2, part 3 of Circular Letter of 1 February 2008 concerning the 
Act on Transsexuality,  BG 20 February 2008. 
 % e newly created Article 62bis of the Civil Code enabled the legal recognition 
of a person ’ s physical transition through an administrative procedure before 
the registrar, who took note of a person ’ s declaration of the  continuing and 
 irreversible inner conviction of belonging to the  ‘ sex opposite to that which is 
mentioned in the birth certi& cate ’. However, this administrative change required 
compliance with very heavy and invasive medical conditions, which had to be 
con& rmed by a psychiatrist and surgeon: 
 –  % e person concerned had the continuing and irreversible conviction of 
belonging to the sex opposite to the one mentioned in the birth certi& cate; 
 –  % e ful& lment of full gender a;  rming therapy, as far as medically possible 
and justi& able; 
 –  No longer being able to procreate according to the  ‘ prior sex ’, i.e. sterility. 20 
 % e registrar dra' ed a certi& cate mentioning the  ‘ new sex ’, which was included 
in the birth register, at the earliest thirty days after the expiration of the period 
of appeal of sixty days following the drafting of the certificate. During that 
period of sixty days, the Public Prosecutor, who was notified within three 
days of the drafting of the certificate, as well as any interested party (e.g. the 
applicant ’ s spouse or descendant), could appeal the change of legal sex before 
the tribunal of first instance. 21 Moreover, the registrar could refuse to draft a 
certificate if, according to the parliamentary preparatory works, no authentic 
check of the required documents could be performed. 22 However, this check 
could not amount to a so-called  ‘ opportunity check ’ . 23 In case of a refusal, 
the registrar had to immediately notify the applicant concerned, provide the 
latter with the motives for refusal, as well as notify the Public Prosecutor. The 
applicant concerned could then appeal before the tribunal of first instance. 
The inclusion of the certificate in the register of births applied  ex nunc and 
resulted in the mention of the  ‘ new sex ’ on the side of the person ’ s birth 
certificate. 
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 24  See  < http://igvm-ie .belgium.be/sites/default/& les/trans_cijfers_rijksregister_2017_nl.pdf > . 
 25  Parl.Doc. Chamber of representatives, 54-2403/001, 4. 
 26  Ibid, 4. 
 27  Although the administrative procedure under the 2007 Act did not mention any age criterion, 
minors were not able to apply for legal gender recognition, since in practice it is impossible in 
Belgium to undergo gender a;  rming surgery treatment before reaching the age of majority. 
 28  Please note that the following paragraphs re< ect the Act ’ s used terminology as closely as 
possible. 
 According to research by the Belgian Institute for the Equality of Women 
and Men, the 2007 Act led to a signi& cant increase of the number of o;  cial legal 
gender recognitions. 24 
 Figure 1.  Graphical presentation of the increase of the number of legal gender 
recognitions a! er the 2007 Act 
  
 Source: Institute for the Equality of Women and Men. 
 1.2.3.   e 2017 Gender Recognition Act 
 % e amendment of Article 62bis (currently Article 135/1) of the Civil Code 
by the 2017 GRA was predominantly aimed at reconciling the Belgian legal 
framework with international human rights standards and the bodily integrity 
of trans persons, 25 and is considered to be a vast improvement of the 2007 Act 
on Transsexuality. However, the legislator not only  removed requirements for 
legal gender recognition , but also  introduced new conditions in order to prevent 
(and/or detect)  ‘ light-hearted ’ applications for legal gender recognition and/or 
(identity) fraud . 26 Importantly, the revised Article 62bis (currently Article 135/1) of 
the Civil Code also e ectively 27 introduced legal gender recognition for minors . 
% e following paragraphs will & rst establish the new administrative procedure 
for adults, before turning to the provisions that are applicable to minors. 28 
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 29  Parl.Doc. Chamber of representatives, 54-2403/001, 21. 
 30  Parl.Doc. Chamber of representatives, 54-2403/004, 17. 
 31  Please note that the Act in this instance does not refer to the  ‘ registered sex ’ , but only to the 
 ‘ sex mentioned in one ’ s birth certi& cate ’ . 
 1.2.3.1. Legal Gender Recognition for Adults 
 On the basis of Article 135/1, every person who  ‘ has the conviction that the 
sex mentioned in their birth certi& cate is not in congruence with their inner 
experienced gender identity ’ may declare such conviction to the registrar. % is 
declaration occurs by handing over a signed declaration which mentions that 
 ‘ one has been convinced for a long time that the sex mentioned in one ’ s birth 
certi& cate is not in congruence with one ’ s inner experienced gender identity ’ and 
that one  ‘ desires the administrative and legal consequences of an amendment of 
the registered sex in one ’ s birth certi& cate ’. A' er this & rst declaration, a number 
of requirements/conditions have to be complied with: 
 –  % e registrar informs the applicant about the further steps of the procedure, 
its administrative and legal consequences and provides the applicant with an 
information brochure, as well as the contact details of trans organisations. 
% e registrar takes note of the declaration and provides the applicant with a 
receipt note. On the basis of the original GRA, the registrar also had to point 
out to the applicant the principled irreversible character of the amendment 
of the registered sex mentioned in the birth certi& cate. However, as will be 
explained below, this provision was annulled by the Constitutional Court; 
 –  % e registrar then noti& es within three days the Public Prosecutor, who  – 
within a period of three months  – may issue positive advice or negative 
advice for reasons of public order. In the absence of any advice within the 
period of three months, the advice is considered to be positive. According 
to the parliamentary preparatory works, the Public Prosecutor ’ s interference 
is essentially aimed at preventing the commitment of identity fraud or other 
violations of public order, e.g. by persons who are the object of an arrest 
warrant, 29 or by potential terrorists; 30 
 –  % e applicant has to make a second declaration, minimum three months and 
maximum six months a' er the issue of the receipt note of the & rst declaration. 
% e applicant hands over a signed declaration that mentions that: 
•  % ey are still convinced that the sex mentioned in their birth certi& cate 31 
is not in congruence with their inner experienced gender identity; 
•  % ey are conscious of the administrative and legal consequences that the 
amendment of the registered sex in their birth certi& cate implies; 
•  According to the original version of the GRA, the applicant also needed 
to declare that they were conscious of the principled irreversible character 
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 32  Parl.Doc. Chamber of representatives, 54-2403/001, 21. 
 33  Parl.Doc. Chamber of representatives, 54-2403/004, 23. 
 34  Parl.Doc. Chamber of representatives, 54-2403/001, 20. 
 35  See Circular Letter of 15 December 2017 on the Act of 25 June 2017 reforming the regulations 
concerning transgender persons regarding the mention and amendment of the registration 
of sex in civil certi& cates and the consequences thereof,  BG 29 December 2017, 116785. It is 
also important to note that the registrar ’ s discretion to refuse legal gender recognition on the 
basis of merely formal reasons is in practice heavily reduced due to the use of templates for 
both declarations, which are provided by the government. 
 36  Parl.Doc. Chamber of representatives, 54-2403/001, 22 – 23. 
of the amendment of the registered sex in their birth certi& cate. However, 
this provision was annulled by the Constitutional Court . 
•  In the absence of negative advice by the Public Prosecutor, the registrar 
dra' s a certi& cate of the amendment of the registered sex and includes 
this certi& cate in the civil registers. Once the certi& cate is dra' ed, the 
amendment of the legal sex enters into force  ex nunc ; 
 –  % e registrar refuses to dra'  the certi& cate in case of negative advice by 
the Public Prosecutor, or on the basis of other motives, e.g. intoxication 
of the applicant 32 or extreme cases of public order, 33 that are immediately 
communicated to the applicant. According to the parliamentary preparatory 
works, these motives may not correspond to a personal conviction held by 
the registrar. 34 % is was a;  rmed by the circular letter clarifying the scope 
and interpretation of the 2017 GRA, which stated that the registrar may not 
exercise any so-called  ‘ opportunity check ’. 35 
 On the basis of the original Gender Recognition Act of 2017, the registrar 
mentioned the amendment of the registered sex on the side of all civil 
certi& cates that apply to the applicant and their lineal descendants in the 
& rst grade. However, since an update of June 2018, that entered into force in 
January 2019, the registrar has to link the amendment of the registered sex to 
all civil certi& cates that mention the sex of (only) the person concerned. % e 
amendment only works e x nunc and is irreversible (in principle). In case of any 
refusal by the registrar, the applicant has the right to appeal with the family court 
within a period of 60 days on the basis of Article 1385duodecies of the Judicial 
Code. % e Public Prosecutor can claim the invalidity of the certi& cate amending 
the registered sex at any time on the basis of a violation of public order. 
 Despite the principled irreversibility of legal gender recognition , one could 
request the family court to reverse the amendment of one ’ s registered sex, yet only 
in cases of  ‘ exceptional circumstances ’. % ese exceptional circumstances were 
not de& ned in the Act. % e government ’ s explanatory memorandum indicated 
experiences of transphobia or a decline in well-being (proving the person 
concerned made an  ‘ error ’ ) as exceptional circumstances. 36 % e parliamentary 
preparatory works did not foresee an evolution in gender identity, i.e. gender 
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 37  Note that the  ‘ continuing ’ conviction is not required for adults. 
 38  Parl.Doc. Chamber of representatives, 54-2403/001, 16; 54-2403/004, 18. 
 39  According to the circular letter clarifying the scope and interpretation of the 2017 GRA, 
both parents do not have to assist the minor at the same time. Both parents or the legal 
representative may also assist the minor applicant through a special and authentic mandate. 
% e applicant, however, needs to appear in person before the registrar. 
 40  % e guardian will then exercise both parents ’ rights. See Circular Letter of 15 December 2017 
on the Act of 25 June 2017 reforming the regulations concerning transgender persons 
regarding the mention and amendment of the registration of sex in civil certi& cates and the 
consequences thereof,  BG 29 December 2017, 116785. 
< uidity, as exceptional circumstances, despite self-determination being the Act ’ s 
foundational principle. As will be explained below, the Constitutional Court 
annulled the provision concerning the judicial procedure to reverse legal gender 
recognition, together with the annulment of the principled irreversibility of legal 
gender recognition. 
 1.2.3.2. Legal Gender Recognition for Minors 
 Since the entry into force of the 2017 GRA, 16- and 17-year-old minors have 
e ectively been able to apply for legal gender recognition. In essence, the 
aforementioned procedure for adults is also applicable to them. Nevertheless, 
there are two important di erences: 
 –  % e minor applicant has to hand over a declaration by a child and adolescent 
psychiatrist that they have the necessary understanding to have the 
continuing 37 conviction that their sex registered in the birth certi& cate is 
not in congruence with their inner experienced gender identity. However, 
according to the parliamentary preparatory works, this interference by a 
psychiatrist has no diagnostic aim; 38 
 –  % e minor applicant has to be assisted by both parents or the legal 
representative during the & rst declaration. 39 If (one of) these persons 
refuse(s) to do so, the minor may request the family court to be assisted by 
an  ad hoc guardian. 40 
 % e 2017 Act also introduced a new framework regarding & liation , considering 
the abolishment of the requirement of sterility for legal gender recognition. 
In essence, trans persons who have and/or recognise children born a' er the 
amendment of their registered sex, will be recognised in the parental role 
(co-mother/father) that is congruent with their amended registered sex. However, 
if a transman gives birth to a child, he will still be recognised as the child ’ s 
mother, due to the rule of  mater semper certa set (i.e. mother is always certain), 
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 41  See  G.  Verschelden ,  ‘ Deel II. De aanpassing van de geslachtsregistratie: voorwaarden, 
gevolgen en overgangsrecht [Part II. % e amendment of sex registration: conditions, 
consequences and transitional arrangements] ’ in  J.  Motmans and  G.  Verschelden (eds.), 
 De rechtspositie van transgenderpersonen in Belgi ë . Een multidisciplinaire analyse na de 
wetten van 25 juni 2017 en 18 juni 2018 [ % e legal status of transgender persons in Belgium. 
A multidisciplinary analysis a' er the Acts of 25 June 2017 and 18 June 2018 ],  Intersentia , 
 Antwerp  2020 . % e rule of  ‘ mater semper certa est ’ essentially refers to the fact that  – at birth  – 
only the relationship between the child and the person who gives birth to the child can be 
known for certain. On the basis of a cisnormative logic, this latter person has female sex 
characteristics and therefore a female gender (identity). % is person is therefore called the 
child ’ s mother. 
 42  Due to the waiting period of minimum three months, the & rst amendments of registered sex 
occurred in April 2018. 
that is central to Belgian & liation law. 41 Since this chapter is focussed on the 
matter of legal gender recognition , it will not thoroughly examine the new 
& liation framework. 
 O;  cial & gures released by the federal Institute for the Equality of Women and 
Men in November 2018 showed a signi& cant increase in the number of instances 
of legal gender recognition due to the 2017 Gender Recognition Act. % e 
amendments of registered sex between April 42 and September 2018 amounted 
to 35 per cent of the total number of amendments since 1993. Applications 
came predominantly from people younger than twenty-& ve, and especially from 
transmen. % e 2017 Act thus clearly met high needs among transgender persons. 
 Figure 2.  Graphical presentation of the increase of the number of legal gender 
recognitions a! er the 2017 Act 
  
 Source: Institute for the Equality of Women and Men. 
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 43  Parl.Doc. Chamber of representatives, 54-2403/001, 4. 
 2.  ANALYSIS OF THE BELGIAN SEX/GENDER 
REGISTRATION FRAMEWORK 
 Now that the structure of the Belgian sex/gender registration framework is 
established, it will be evaluated in light of the international human rights 
law standards in the & eld of gender identity, and more speci& cally the right 
to personal autonomy/self-determination and its necessary implications. 
A combination of international (so' ) law, foreign law, (inter)national case law 
and scholarship will be used, in order to identify the  ‘ best practice ’ regarding 
gender recognition against which the Belgian legal framework will be measured. 
 More speci& cally, the scope of the recognition of the right to gender 
self-determination in Belgian law will & rst be analysed ( Section 2.1 ). Subsequently, 
it will be established to what extent the Belgian sex/gender registration framework 
expresses notions of (de)pathologisation of trans persons ( Section 2.2 ), 
cisnormativity and con< ation between sex and gender identity ( Section 2.3 ) 
and binary normativity ( Section 2.4 ). % e Act is evaluated taking into account 
the 2019 judgment of the Constitutional Court, in which parts of the Act were 
found unconstitutional. 
 2.1.  THE RIGHT TO (LEGAL RECOGNITION OF) GENDER 
IDENTITY BASED ON SELF-DETERMINATION 
 Although at this point it might seem self-evident in Belgian law to  have 
procedures that enable the correct registration of a person ’ s gender identity, it 
needs to be discussed whether there exists a  right to (the legal recognition of) 
gender identity in human rights law in the & rst place, and whether this right is 
embedded in gender self-determination . % is discussion is not purely theoretical, 
since the & rst paragraph of the Belgian government ’ s explanatory memorandum 
to the 2017 GRA explicitly referred to Belgium ’ s obligations under international 
human rights law regarding gender recognition. 43 
 2.1.1.   e (Scope of the) Right to (Legal Recognition of) Gender Identity 
in International (So# ) Law Instruments 
 Trans persons, unlike people who are socially discriminated against on grounds 
like sex, race, ethnicity or disability, lack a particular international convention 
which obliges States to ensure that their human rights, and more speci& cally 
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 44  A.  Hellum ,  ‘ Human Rights, Sexual Orientaion, and Gender identity ’ in  A.  Hellum (ed.), 
 Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity ,  Routledge ,  London  2017 , p. 1. 
See also  M.  van den Brink ,  ‘ “ % e Legitimate Aim of Harmonising Body and Soul ” . Changing 
Legal Gender: Family Life and Human Rights ’ in  K.  Boele-Woelki and  A.  Fuchs (eds.), 
 Same-Sex Relationships and Beyond. Gender Matters in the EU ,  Intersentia ,  Cambridge  2017 , 
p.  234 . 
 45  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights ,  ‘ Combatting 
Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender identity ’ ,  < http://www.ohchr.org/
EN/Issues/Discrimination/Pages/LGBT.aspx > . 
 46  H.  Lau ,  ‘ Gender Recognition as a Human Right ’ in  A.  Von Arnauld ,  K.  Odendahl and 
 M.  Susi (eds.),   e Cambridge Handbook on New Human Rights: Recognition, Novelty, 
Rhetoric ,  Cambridge University Press ,  Cambridge  2020 . 
 47  J.T.  Theilen ,  ‘ Pre-Existing Rights and Future Articulations. Temporal Rhetoric in the Struggle 
for Trans Rights ’ in  A.  Von Arnauld ,  K.  Odendahl and  M.  Susi (eds.),   e Cambridge 
Handbook on New Human Rights: Recognition, Novelty, Rhetoric ,  Cambridge University Press , 
 Cambridge  2020 . 
 48  E.  Baisley ,  ‘ Reaching the Tipping Point ? : Emerging International Human Rights Norms 
Pertaining to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity ’ ( 2016 )  38  Human Rights Quarterly , 
 134 – 163 . 
 49  See ibid, 134, 135 – 136, and the references there included. 
 50  Ibid, 134, 136. 
 51  See in this regard also  H.  Lau ,  ‘ Gender Recognition as a Human Right ’ in  A.  Von Arnauld , 
 K.  Odendahl and  M.  Susi (eds.),   e Cambridge Handbook on New Human Rights: 
Recognition, Novelty, Rhetoric ,  Cambridge University Press ,  Cambridge  2020 . See also 
 M.  van den Brink ,  ‘ “ % e Legitimate Aim of Harmonising Body and Soul ” . Changing Legal 
Gender: Family Life and Human Rights ’ in  K.  Boele-Woelki and  A.  Fuchs (eds.),  Same-Sex 
Relationships and Beyond. Gender Matters in the EU ,  Intersentia ,  Cambridge  2017 , p.  234 . 
their right to equality and non-discrimination, are respected, protected and 
ful& lled. 44 However, according to the O;  ce of the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, 
 protecting LGBT people from violence and discrimination does not require the 
creation of a new set of LGBT-speci& c rights, nor does it require the establishment of 
new international human rights standards; the legal obligations of States to safeguard 
the human rights of LGBT people are well established in international human rights 
law on the basis of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and subsequently 
agreed international human rights standards. 45 
 Whilst authors like Lau, 46 % eilen 47 and Baisley 48 concur that gender identity 
rights exist or are emerging under human rights law, others disagree. 49 Moreover, 
a vast number of States  – in all continents  – still resist the recognition of gender 
identity rights in international law, especially within the more  ‘ political ’ bodies 
of the UN, such as the Human Rights Council. 50 
 % is (emerging) right to (legal recognition of) gender identity is based on 
personal autonomy and gender self-determination . % is can be noted in several 
international so'  law instruments, 51 starting with the Yogyakarta Principles  + 10 , 
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 52  Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly ,  ‘ Resolution 2048 (2015)  “ Discrimination against 
transgender people in Europe ” ’,  < http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-EN.
asp?& leid=21736 > . 
 53  Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly ,  ‘ Resolution 2191 (2017)  “ promoting the 
human rights of and eliminating discrimination against intersex people ” ’ ,  < http://assembly.
coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?& leid=24232&lang=en > . 
 54  Committee on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women. 
 55  See  M.  van den Brink ,  ‘ “ % e Legitimate Aim of Harmonising Body and Soul ” . Changing 
Legal Gender: Family Life and Human Rights ’ in  K.  Boele-Woelki and  A.  Fuchs (eds.), 
 Same-Sex Relationships and Beyond. Gender Matters in the EU ,  Intersentia ,  Cambridge  2017 , 
p. 235. 
which apply existing standards of international human rights law to issues 
of sexual orientation and gender identity. Principle 3 holds that States shall 
 ‘ [ … ] take all necessary legislative, administrative and other measures to 
fully respect and legally recognise each person ’ s self-de& ned gender identity ’. 
Principle 3 was further elaborated in Principle 31. On the basis of the latter 
provision, States shall,  inter alia , 
 while sex or gender continues to be registered, ensure access to a quick, transparent 
and accessible mechanism that legally recognises and a;  rms each person ’ s 
self-de& ned gender identity; make available a multiplicity of gender marker options; 
ensure that no eligibility criteria, such as medical or psychological interventions, a 
psycho-medical diagnosis, minimum or maximum age [ … ] shall be a prerequisite to 
change one ’ s name, legal sex or gender. 
 In 2015, the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly adopted Resolution 2048 
(2015), which not only welcomed the emergence of a right to gender identity 
that gives every individual the right to recognition of their gender identity and 
the right to be treated and identi& ed according to this identity, but also called 
on States to develop quick, transparent and accessible procedures, based on 
self-determination, for changing the name and registered sex of trans people 
on birth certi& cates, identity cards, passports, educational certi& cates and other 
similar documents. 52 % e same call regarding legal gender recognition and gender 
self-determination was repeated in Resolution 2191 (2017). 53 UN human rights 
treaty bodies, such as the Human Rights Committee (HRC), the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), and the CEDAW 54 Committee 
have also started to bring attention to the situation of trans persons in their 
General Comments and country-speci& c concluding observations. 55 In 2018, 
the UN Independent Expert on Protection against Violence and Discrimination 
based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity has also recommended to 
States to  ‘ enact gender recognition laws concerning the rights of trans persons 
to change their name and gender markers on identi& cation documents. Such 
procedures should be quick, transparent and accessible, without abusive 
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 56  V.  Madrigal-Borloz ,  ‘ Report of the Independent Expert on protection against violence and 
discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity ’ ,  < https://www.un.org/en/ga/
search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/73/152 > . 
 57  H.  Lau ,  ‘ Gender Recognition as a Human Right ’ in  A.  Von Arnauld ,  K.  Odendahl and 
 M.  Susi (eds.),   e Cambridge Handbook on New Human Rights: Recognition, Novelty, 
Rhetoric ,  Cambridge University Press ,  Cambridge  2020 .  Lau strongly supports the argument 
that gender identity rights are based on longstanding civil rights and are therefore only  ‘ new ’ 
in very narrow regards. 
 58  Art. 22 of the UDHR holds:  ‘ Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security 
and is entitled to realization, through national e ort and international co-operation and in 
accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and 
cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality ’ . 
% is is arguably also true for Art. 8 of the ECHR, in light of the ECtHR ’ s case law regarding 
personal autonomy and self-determination of gender identity. 
 59  See also, e.g. ECtHR 12 June 2003, 35968/97,  Van K ü ck v. Germany , para. 73, where the Court 
stated that the freedom to de& ne one ’ s gender identity is one of the most basic essentials of 
self-determination. 
 60  H.  Lau ,  ‘ Gender Recognition as a Human Right ’ in  A.  Von Arnauld ,  K.  Odendahl and 
 M.  Susi (eds.),   e Cambridge Handbook on New Human Rights: Recognition, Novelty, 
Rhetoric ,  Cambridge University Press ,  Cambridge  2020 . 
 61  IACtHR 24 November 2017, Advisory Opinion OC-24/17. 
conditions, and respectful of the principle of free and informed choice, and of 
personal integrity ’. 56 
 From this alleged existence of gender identity rights under international 
law, Lau deduces the right for individuals to obtain government-issued identity 
documents that match their gender identity. 57 He argues that the right to 
gender recognition is grounded in the right to privacy, the right to health, the 
right to bodily integrity, and the right to personal autonomy  ex Article 22 of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 58 Indeed, an important aspect of 
personal autonomy is the freedom to determine one ’ s own identity. 59 According 
to Lau, such claims are particularly important with respect to decisions that are 
socially constructed as being salient to intersubjective identity, as is the case with 
gender identity; a' er all, gender identity is a particularly important aspect of the 
identities that people hold in relation to each other, making self-determination 
of gender identity all the more crucial to protect. 60 In November 2017, the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights issued an advisory opinion that held 
that  – referring  inter alia to the Yogyakarta Principles  + 10  – all individuals 
have the right to have their name and o;  cial documents amended in light of 
their gender (identity) on the basis of self-determination, and therefore without 
having to comply with any medical conditions. 61 
 Developments in international law thus cautiously seem to indicate 
the emergence of the existence of both a right to gender identity and 
a right to the legal recognition thereof, solely on the basis of personal 
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 62  See in this regard also  B.  Vanderhorst ,  ‘ Wither Lies the Self: Intersex and Transgender 
Individuals and A Proposal for Brain-Based Legal Sex ’ ( 2015 )  9  Harvard Law  & Policy 
Review ,  241 , 245. 
 63  In addition to these countries, France and Greece have recently introduced a  judicial 
procedure based on gender self-identi& cation. In March 2018 the Brazilian Supreme Court 
held that it may no longer be required from transgender persons to undergo medical 
treatment and/or psychiatric assessment for the legal recognition of their gender identity and 
an o;  cial change of & rst name. 
 64  Art. 3 of the Gender Identity, Gender Expression and Sex Characteristics Act of 14 April 2015 
to provide for the recognition and registration of the gender of a person and to regulate the 
e ects of such a change, as well as the recognition and protection of the sex characteristics of 
a person,  Government Gazette of Malta No. 19,410. 
 65  See in this regard also  J.T.  Theilen ,  ‘ % e Long Road to Recognition: Transgender Rights 
and Transgender Reality in Europe ’ in  G.  Schreiber (ed.),  Transsexualit ä t in  eologie und 
Neurowissenscha# en. Ergebnisse, Kontroversen, Perspektiven ,  De Gruyter ,  Berlin  2016 , p. 390. 
However, also in other countries, scholars see a right to gender self-determination in national 
(constitutional) law. See for instance L angley (USA), who argues that  ‘ to fully realize the 
Fourteenth Amendment ’ s promise of liberty, people must be able to determine gender for 
themselves ’ . See  L.  L angley ,  ‘ Self-Determination in a Gender Fundamentalist State: Toward 
Legal Liberation of Transgender Identities ’ ( 2006 )  12  Texas Journal on Civil Liberties and Civil 
Rights ,  101 . 
 66  E.  Baisley ,  ‘ Reaching the Tipping Point ? : Emerging International Human Rights Norms 
Pertaining to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity ’ ( 2016 )  38  Human Rights Quarterly , 
 134 , 163. 
autonomy/self-determination. 62 Moreover, as mentioned above, since 2012, 
a small, yet increasing number of countries worldwide have adopted an 
administrative procedure of legal gender recognition based on personal 
autonomy/self-determination. 63 In Malta, all individuals even have the subjective 
right to gender identity. 64 Although these States represent only a limited group of 
progressive leaders at the national level, they are important not only because of 
the legal result that they achieved, but arguably also because of the more general 
change in attitude that they help bring about. 65 In this regard, Baisley argues 
that, next to high-ranking UN o;  cials, States have been the most e ective norm 
entrepreneurs concerning issues of gender identity. 66 
 Moreover, a (limited) right to (legal recognition of) gender identity can 
also be deduced from the case law of the ECtHR . Given the great importance 
of the Court ’ s case law for Belgian law, the next section will establish the scope 
of gender identity rights under Article 8 of the ECHR. 
 2.1.2.   e Right to (Legal Recognition of) Gender Identity under Article 8 
of the ECHR 
 % e European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) does not explicitly 
mention the matter of gender identity registration. However, the ECtHR has 
held in the past that the individual freedom to de& ne one ’ s gender identity 
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 67  ECtHR  6 April 2017 ,  79885/12, 52471/13, 52596/13,  A.P., Gar ç on and Nicot v. France , 
para. 93;  12 June 2003 ,  35968/97 ,  Van K ü ck v. Germany , para. 73. 
 68  Ibid, para. 66. See in this sense also ECtHR 17 January 2019, 29683/16,  X v. the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia , para. 38. 
 69  ECtHR  6 April 2017 ,  79885/12, 52471/13, 52596/13,  A.P., Gar ç on and Nicot v. France , para. 93. 
 70  ECtHR  10 March 2015 ,  14793/08,  Y.Y. v. Turkey , para. 56;  22 October 1981 ,  Dudgeon 
v. the United Kingdom ,  Series A no. 45 , pp. 18 – 19, para. 41. See in this sense also  ECtHR 
 17 January 2019 ,  29663/16,  X v. the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia , para. 38. 
 71  ECtHR  11 July 2002 ,  28957/95,  Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom , para. 90. 
 72  B.  Rudolf ,  ‘ European Court of Human Rights: Legal status of postoperative transsexuals ’ 
( 2003 )  1  International Journal of Constitutional Law ,  716 , 721. 
 73  See in this regard also  A.  S ø rlie ,  ‘ Legal Gender Meets Reality: A Socio-Legal Children ’ s 
Perspective ’ in  A.  Hellum (ed.),  Human Rights, Sexual Orientation, and Gender Identity , 
 Routledge ,  London  2017 , p. 81. 
 74  In the & rst cases concerning legal gender recognition that reached Strasbourg, the Court 
did not & nd a violation of Art. 8, despite being  ‘ conscious of the seriousness of the problems 
a ecting transsexuals and the distress they su er ’ . Departing from a very biological vision of 
sex and taking into account the lack of consensus among States, the Court le'  it open to the 
margin of appreciation of States to accommodate the demands of trans(sexual) persons. See 
 ECtHR  17 October 1986 ,  9532/81,  Rees v. the United Kingdom ;  27 September 1990 ,  10843/84 , 
 Cossey v. the United Kingdom ;  30 July 1998 ,  22985/93 and 23390/94 ,  She+  eld and Horsham v. 
the United Kingdom . 
 75  ECtHR  11 July 2002 ,  35968/97,  Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom . See in this regard also 
 J.T.  Theilen ,  ‘ % e Long Road to Recognition: Transgender Rights and Transgender Reality 
in Europe ’ in  G.  Schreiber (ed.),  Transsexualit ä t in   eologie und Neurowissenscha# en. 
Ergebnisse, Kontroversen, Perspektiven ,  De Gruyter ,  Berlin  2016 , p. 377. See in this regard also 
 F.R.  Ammaturo ,  European Sexual Citizenship. Human Rights, Bodies and Identities ,  Palgrave , 
 London  2017 , p. 22. 
is one of the most basic essentials of self-determination. 67 Indeed, according 
to the Court, one ’ s right to gender identity and to personal development is a 
fundamental aspect of the right to respect for private life. 68 Although it has 
only once explicitly placed individual decisions regarding one ’ s gender identity 
under the scope of the right to personal autonomy  ex Article 8 of the ECHR, 69 it 
considers that  ‘ elements such as gender identi& cation, names, sexual orientation 
and sexual life fall within the personal sphere protected by Article 8 ’, 70 of which 
the guarantees are interpreted based on the underlying principle of personal 
autonomy. It has in that sense also stated that  ‘ protection is given to the personal 
sphere of each individual, including their right to establish details of their 
identity as human beings ’, 71 which encompasses the harmonisation of one ’ s sex 
and self-perceived gender identity. 72 It may therefore be stated that the right to 
establish one ’ s personal and gender identity is founded on the right to personal 
autonomy under Article 8 of the Convention. 73 From that right, the Court has 
over time 74 deduced the positive obligation for States to implement a framework 
of legal gender recognition for (post-operative) transsexual persons, taking into 
account international scienti& c, social and legal developments. 
 With regard then to the  legal recognition of this self-de& ned gender identity, 
the true landmark case was  Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom , 75 in which 
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 76  See in this regard also  J.T.  Theilen ,  ‘ % e Long Road to Recognition: Transgender Rights 
and Transgender Reality in Europe ’ in  G.  Schreiber (ed.),  Transsexualit ä t in  eologie und 
Neurowissenscha# en. Ergebnisse, Kontroversen, Perspektiven ,  De Gruyter ,  Berlin  2016 , p. 377. 
 77  ECtHR  17 January 2019 ,  29663/16,  X v. the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia , para. 70. 
 78  See for instance  ECtHR  10 March 2015 ,  14793/08,  Y.Y. v. Turkey , para. 110;  ECtHR 
 6 April 2017 ,  79885/12, 52471/13, 52596/13,  A.P., Gar ç on and Nicot v. France , paras. 99 – 100. 
 79  ECtHR  6 April 2017 ,  79885/12, 52471/13, 52596/13,  A.P., Gar ç on and Nicot v. France , 
para. 132. Nevertheless, there are still a number of Council of Europe Member States that 
do not provide a possibility of legal gender recognition: Albania, Andorra, Cyprus, Kosovo, 
Liechtenstein, Macedonia, Monaco and San Marino. 
 80  ECtHR  23 May 2006 ,  32570/03,  Grant v. the United Kingdom , para. 43. 
 81  See in this regard also  J.T.  Theilen ,  ‘ % e Long Road to Recognition: Transgender Rights 
and Transgender Reality in Europe ’ in  G.  Schreiber (ed.),  Transsexualit ä t in  eologie und 
Neurowissenscha# en. Ergebnisse, Kontroversen, Perspektiven ,  De Gruyter ,  Berlin  2016 , p. 377. 
 82  See in this regard ibid, p. 378. See also  F.R.  Ammaturo ,  European Sexual Citizenship. 
Human Rights, Bodies and Identities ,  Palgrave ,  London  2017 , p. 77;  M.  van den Brink , 
 ‘ “ % e Legitimate Aim of Harmonising Body and Soul ” . Changing Legal Gender: Family Life 
and Human Rights ’ in  K.  Boele-Woelki and  A.  Fuchs (eds.),  Same-Sex Relationships and 
Beyond. Gender Matters in the EU ,  Intersentia ,  Cambridge  2017 , p. 237. 
 83  See also  F.R.  Ammaturo ,  European Sexual Citizenship. Human Rights, Bodies and Identities , 
 Palgrave ,  London  2017 , pp. 73 – 75. 
trans(sexual) persons were arguably written into legal existence at the European 
level. 76 A' er acknowledging that gender identity is an important aspect of 
personal identity, the Court referred to international evolutions in science, 
medicine, society and the law to & nd that the matter of legal gender recognition 
could no longer fall within the State ’ s margin of appreciation, save as regards 
the appropriate means of achieving this recognition (i.e. the conditions for legal 
gender recognition). In  X v. the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2019), 
the Court added that this legal recognition must be based on  ‘ quick, transparent 
and accessible procedures ’, mirroring the wording of the Council of Europe 
Parliamentary Assembly ’ s Resolution 2048 (2015). 77 It a;  rmed this ruling in 
later case law, 78 in which it even held that the legal recognition of one ’ s  ‘ sexual 
identity ’ amounts to a  right of the individual under Article 8 of the ECHR. 79 
Moreover, States have the positive obligation to grant the bene& ts connected 
to the  ‘ new ’ sex/gender a' er its legal recognition, such as pension rights. 80 
Nevertheless, States still maintain a margin of appreciation to set conditions 
to the exercise of the right to legal gender recognition. In other words, while 
individuals have the right to de& ne their own gender identity based on their 
personal autonomy under Article 8, 81 the  legal recognition thereof may be made 
conditional by the State, which may include medical requirements with the 
exception of a condition of sterility. 82 % e ECtHR ’ s case law therefore appears 
to be less progressive than the emerging standards regarding legal gender 
recognition in international (so' ) law. 83 
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 84  Art. 3 of Gender Identity, Gender Expression and Sex Characteristics Act of 14 April 2015 
to provide for the recognition and registration of the gender of a person and to regulate the 
e ects of such a change, as well as the recognition and protection of the sex characteristics of 
a person,  Government Gazette of Malta No. 19,410. 
 85  Parl.Doc. Chamber of representatives, 54-2403/004, 5 – 6. 
 86  In the context of this chapter, the notion of  ‘ trans pathologisation ’ will be used in the broad 
sense, i.e. referring to both medical diagnoses of gender dysphoria/gender incongruence and 
forms of compulsory medical intervention, such as genital surgery and hormonal treatment. 
 2.1.3.   e 2017 Gender Recognition Act 
 Although it is regrettable that the Belgian 2017 Gender Recognition Act  – 
contrary to Malta ’ s 2015 GIGESC Act  84  – does not explicitly refer to a (trans) 
person ’ s right to legal gender recognition , it is clearly implicitly based thereon. 
Nevertheless, it seems that the Act is still embedded in the logic concerning 
legal gender recognition that can be found in the ECtHR ’ s case law. Indeed, the 
parliamentary preparatory works indicate that, although self-determination 
is the principle underlying the new legal gender recognition framework, it is 
self-determination  ‘ under limitations ’. 85 In other words, whilst the Belgian 
legislator recognised its obligations to respect every person ’ s personal autonomy 
regarding their gender identity, and signi& cantly improved the legal status of 
trans persons, it made use of the margin of appreciation granted by the ECtHR 
to set conditions to implement the positive obligation to legally recognise a 
person ’ s gender identity which limit the latter ’ s right to personal autonomy. 
It thus appears that Belgian law is (only) on the verge of  fully joining the 
abovementioned emerging move in international (human rights) law to base 
legal gender recognition  solely on gender self-determination . 
 Given this dual nature of the 2017 GRA, the following sections will 
evaluate the restrictions to the full measure of self-determination that are, 
on the one hand, explicitly renounced, and/or, on the other hand, upheld or 
even introduced by the Act. % ese abolished, lingering and/or new restrictions 
relate to the conceptual framing of sex and gender, and the material and formal 
conditions for legal gender registration. In this regard, the (de)pathologisation 
of trans persons ( Section 2.2 ), as well as the cisnormativity ( Section 2.3 ) and 
binary normativity ( Section 2.4 ) of the Act will be discussed. 
 2.2. (DE)PATHOLOGISATION OF TRANSGENDER PERSONS 
 % e most important restriction to the full implementation of gender 
self-determination in the procedure of legal gender recognition has to do 
with the so-called pathologisation 86 of gender variation and trans persons in 
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 87  % e 2018 update of the WHO ’ s International Classi& cation of Diseases (ICD-11) removed the 
diagnosis of gender dysphoria from the category of mental disorders. % e new condition of 
 ‘ gender incongruence ’ is added to the category of  ‘ conditions related to sexual health ’ . 
 88  See  H.  Lau ,  ‘ Gender Recognition as a Human Right ’ in  A.  Von Arnauld ,  K.  Odendahl 
and  M.  Susi (eds.),   e Cambridge Handbook on New Human Rights: Recognition, Novelty, 
Rhetoric ,  Cambridge University Press ,  Cambridge  2020 . 
 89  J.T.  Theilen ,  ‘ Depathologisation of Transgenderism and International Human Rights Law ’ 
( 2014 )  14  Human Rights Law Review ,  327 , 334. See in this regard also  H.  Lau ,  ‘ Gender 
Recognition as a Human Right ’ in  A.  Von Arnauld , K. Odendahl and  M.  Susi (eds.), 
  e Cambridge Handbook on New Human Rights: Recognition, Novelty, Rhetoric ,  Cambridge 
University Press ,  Cambridge  2020 . 
 90  See in this regard  E.  Bribosia and  I.  Rorive ,  ‘ Human rights integration in action: making 
equality law work for trans people in Belgium ’ in  E.  Brems (ed.),  Fragmentation and Integration 
in Human Rights Law: Users ’ Perspectives ,  Edward Elgar Publishers ,  Cheltenham  2018 , p. 121. 
 91  I.e. the con< ation between transsexuality and gender incongruence. 
society and law. Although gender incongruence is no longer considered to be 
a mental disorder or disease by leading international classi& cations of mental 
pathologies, 87 some trans persons consider their gender identity to be a health 
issue and therefore seek access to healthcare to receive treatment, for instance 
on their sex characteristics. 88 However, many trans persons have no interest in 
hormone treatment or surgery, especially when leading to sex reassignment. 89 
Other trans persons do seek access to healthcare, yet face a vast amount of 
di erent reasons which prevent treatment. 90 Nevertheless, many States in 
Europe and around the globe have re< ected this pathologisation of trans persons 
in law, by making legal gender recognition dependent on requirements of a 
psycho-medical nature, ranging from a psycho-medical assessment or even a 
diagnosis of transsexuality/gender dysphoria, over gender a;  rming treatment, 
to compulsory sterility . 
 Besides being conceptually based on stereotypes of gender variation, 91 
cisnormativity and binary normativity, these medical requirements for legal 
gender recognition are also highly disputed from a human rights perspective. 
It is therefore necessary to evaluate the new Belgian framework regarding 
legal gender recognition from this perspective of depathologisation. Before 
turning to the 2017 GRA, it will & rst be established what standards of trans 
depathologisation can be deduced from international and European human 
rights law. 
 2.2.1. Right to Depathologisation under (International) Human Rights Law 
 2.2.1.1. Trans Depathologisation under International Law 
 According to % eilen, several developments at the international level are 
indicative of the existence of a human right to trans depathologisation under 
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the implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
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CEDAW/C/SVK/CO/5-6 (2017), p. 14; and on Slovakia, CEDAW/C/MNE/CO/2 (2016), 
p. 12. See also the Interagency statement by ILO, OHCHR, UNAIDS, UNDP, UNESCO, 
UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNODC, UN Women, WFP and WHO calling for an end to 
violence and discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons 
that condemned forced or coercive sterilisation, forced genital and anal examinations, and 
unnecessary surgery and treatment in intersex children without their consent. 
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transgender people in Europe ” ’,  < http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-EN.
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 98  European Parliament ,  ‘ Resolution of 14 February 2017 on promoting gender equality 
in mental health and clinical research ’ ( 2016 / 2096(INI) ),  < http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-%2f%2fEP%2f%2fTEXT%2bTA%2bP8-TA-2017-0028%2b0%2b
DOC%2bXML%2bV0%2f%2fEN&language=EN > . 
international law, and more speci& cally under the right to non-discrimination 
regarding health  ex Articles 12  jo. 2(2) of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the right to private life  ex Article 8 of the 
ECHR and Article 17 of the ICCPR, and the right to personal autonomy under 
Article 8 of the ECHR. 92 % ey deduce the existence of such right predominantly 
from international and European so'  law instruments, such as Yogyakarta 
Principles 3 and 18, 93 the Issue Paper on human rights and gender identity by 
former Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights Hammarberg, 94 and 
the country-speci& c concluding observations by the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), 95 which all renounce in some form the 
conceptualisation of transsexuality/gender incongruence as a medical condition 
and the usage of pathologising conditions in legal gender recognition procedures. 
Moreover, since % eilen ’ s writing (2014), other institutional human rights actors 
have also repeatedly called for the elimination of any pathologisation of trans 
persons. Indeed, several UN treaty bodies and agencies have called for the 
abolition of medical requirements in the context of legal gender recognition . 96 
Among European institutions, the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 97 
and the European Parliament 98 undertook similar initiatives. Nevertheless, 
the depathologisation of trans persons does not necessarily contradict the 
recognition of the legitimate question of some trans persons to have access to 
healthcare in order to undergo treatment on their sex characteristics. Indeed, 
according to Hammarberg, from a human rights and healthcare perspective, 
no diagnosis is needed in order to give access to treatment for a situation in 
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International Law Review ,  797 , 801. 
need of medical care. 99 In this regard, the coverage of several expenses regarding 
pregnancy shows that having a disease is not a necessary condition of being 
a orded healthcare. 100 
 Next to these international developments that speci& cally concern legal 
gender recognition, Lau argues that the human right to bodily integrity also 
supports the depathologisation of trans persons in law. % e right to bodily or 
physical integrity , which can be derived from the right to private life and/or the 
right to be free from torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, 101 
includes the freedom to make decisions concerning one ’ s own body. According 
to Lau, this means that the government must not force individuals to undergo 
unwanted medical treatment and therefore must not make the right to gender 
recognition contingent on the individual undergoing medical care such as 
surgeries to alter genitalia. 102 
 2.2.1.2. Trans Depathologisation under the ECHR 
 Departing from their hypothesis that a right to depathologisation of gender 
incongruence exists under international human rights law, % eilen identi& es an 
obligation on every State of respect, i.e. to refrain from requiring any medical 
condition in order to have one ’ s registered sex amended, 103 ranging from 
some sort of medical or psychological report or assessment to the compulsory 
requirement of sterility . However, it is also worth questioning whether the same 
obligation of respect for a trans person ’ s self-de& ned gender identity exists under 
the ECHR, as interpreted by the ECtHR , whose case law is authoritative around 
the globe. 104 In this regard, it may be argued that the aforementioned right to 
depathologisation cannot be deduced from the case law of the ECtHR in the 
same way. 
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 110  ECtHR  6 April 2017 ,  79885/12, 52471/13, 52596/13,  A.P., Gar ç on and Nicot v. France , para. 132. 
% e Court did not mention Art. 3 of the ECHR in the operative part of its judgment. 
 Although it was already mentioned above that the Court recognises under 
Article 8 of the ECHR a right to self-determination with regard to gender 
identity and a positive obligation on States to foresee a procedure for legal gender 
recognition, the legal pathologisation of trans persons has only scarcely reached 
its attention. Even though cases concerning aspects of medical gender a;  rming 
therapy had previously reached the Court, until 2017 it did not explicitly 
address the issue of the conformity with the ECHR of medical requirements as a 
prerequisite to obtaining legal gender recognition. 105 
 Medical conditions for legal gender recognitions & nally explicitly arose in 
the case of  A.P., Gar ç on and Nicot v. France (2017) . 106 % e ECtHR & rst addressed 
the condition of the so-called  ‘ irreversibility of the transformation of the bodily 
appearance ’. Whilst the French Government argued that this irreversibility 
did not necessarily entail a surgical intervention or treatment leading to the 
person ’ s sterility , the Court nevertheless aligned this condition with a  de facto 
condition of surgical or hormonal sterilisation. 107 In other words, the Court did 
not address other medical conditions which could fall under  ‘ irreversibility of 
the transformation of the bodily appearance ’, such as gender a;  rming surgery 
or hormonal treatment. % e Court then held that conditioning legal gender 
recognition on sterilising surgery or treatment, which the person concerned 
does not wish to undergo, comes down to conditioning the exercise of the right 
to respect for one ’ s private life under Article 8 on the renunciation of one ’ s right 
to physical integrity, protected by Articles 8 and 3 of the ECHR, 108 which causes 
an impossible dilemma. 109 Even though it acknowledged the importance of the 
general interests of the non-disposability, truthfulness and coherence of the civil 
status, it found that the State failed to strike a fair balance between those interests 
and the rights of the applicants and therefore violated Article 8 of the ECHR. 110 
 % e second applicant had submitted that making legal recognition of gender 
identity conditional of proof that one su ered from a gender identity disorder, 
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amounted to labelling trans persons as mentally ill, and hence to an infringement 
of their dignity. Nevertheless, the Court upheld the condition of providing 
evidence of the existence of the  ‘ syndrome of transsexuality ’, considering the 
classi& cation of  ‘ transsexuality ’ as a form of gender identity disorder in ICD-10, 111 
the absence of a comparable international trend towards the abolition of a mental 
health assessment for gender recognition, and the smaller consequences for the 
person ’ s physical integrity. % e Court also endorsed the French Government ’ s 
position that the diagnosis requirement is aimed at safeguarding the interests 
of the persons concerned in that it is designed in any event to ensure that they 
do not embark unadvisedly on the process of legally changing their identity. In 
this regard, the condition met the general interest in safeguarding the principle 
of the inalienability of civil status, the reliability and consistency of civil-status 
records, and legal certainty, given that this requirement also promotes stability 
in changes of gender in civil-status documents. 112 % e case thus had for direct 
e ect the illegality of a condition of sterility for legal gender recognition under 
Article 8 of the ECHR , while upholding the trans pathologisation in general. 113 
 In 2019, the Court again had the opportunity to address other medicalised 
conditions for legal gender recognition than the sterility requirement. % e case 
of  X v. the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia concerned a transman, who 
the Court identi& ed as a pre-operative transsexual. 114 Indeed, the applicant had 
been diagnosed by a psychologist and sexologist with  ‘ transsexuality ’. Over the 
years, X had started hormonal treatment to increase his testosterone levels and 
had undergone a double mastectomy. However, he had shown no intention of 
undergoing gender a;  rming genital surgery. From 2011 onwards, the applicant 
had lodged several applications with the Macedonian civil registry in order to 
have the sex/gender marker and the numerical personal code 115 on his birth 
certi& cate changed in light of his actual gender (identity). However, the registry 
dismissed the applications, stating that X had not obtained a medical certi& cate 
providing evidence of  ‘ an actual change of sex ’. 116 Although the Administrative 
Court had quashed one of the registry ’ s dismissals, it eventually only ordered the 
registry to specify the evidence that needed to be adduced without stipulating 
whether legal gender recognition needed to be granted or not. % e applicant 
not only complained to the ECtHR about the lacking Macedonian regulatory 
framework for legal gender recognition, he also considered the obligatory 
condition of gender a;  rming surgery a violation of his right to bodily integrity 
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under Article 8 of the ECHR. However, the Court only addressed the quality of 
the regulatory framework in a somewhat arti& cial manner. Indeed, the Court 
focussed on the legal uncertainty for transgender persons regarding the required 
evidence they needed to present to the civil registry. 117 Since the government 
could not provide any information on the procedure for obtaining the relevant 
evidence or that it was regulated by law or judicial practice, the Court decided 
that the FYR of Macedonia had failed to implement its positive obligation under 
Article 8 to provide quick, transparent and accessible procedures for legal gender 
recognition. 118 Taking into account this uncertainty regarding the required 
evidence, the Court decided not to speculate whether a condition of compulsory 
gender a;  rming surgery was indeed required or not. 119 Nevertheless, as the 
dissenting judges  – who argued that the applicant ’ s claim did not fall under the 
scope of Article 8 to begin with  – rightly stated, there were numerous indications 
in the domestic procedures that the Macedonian authorities indeed required 
gender a;  rming surgery and would continue to do so. 120 In other words, the 
Court had su;  cient information to know that, ultimately, the core issue for the 
applicant would be his objection to undergoing gender a;  rming therapy, 121 
instead of the lack of an accessible and foreseeable regulatory framework for 
gender recognition. 
 2.2.2.   e 2017 Gender Recognition Act 
 When reading the parliamentary preparatory works to the Belgian 2017 GRA, 
it is indisputable that the government ’ s primary aim by introducing the Act was 
depathologising trans persons within the legal procedure of gender recognition. 
% is already becomes clear in the & rst paragraph of the government ’ s explanatory 
memorandum to the Act, which explicitly refers to the non-compliance of 
the 2007 Act ’ s invasive medical requirements with international human rights 
law standards. 122 Indeed, the government enumerated many of the instruments 
of international (so' ) law and the ECtHR cases that were mentioned above, to 
support the necessity of the abolition of  all medical requirements for legal gender 
recognition. 123 In this regard, the Belgian legislator became more progressive 
than is seemingly required by the ECtHR ’ s most recent case law. 
 Nevertheless, despite the obvious and commendable progress in the 
protection of the human rights of trans persons, two important critiques can 
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still be made: (1) the Act did not fully depathologise trans  minors , and (2) the 
legal  pathologisation of trans persons was replaced by legal  paternalisation . In 
other words, the Belgian legislator failed to fully take the principle of gender 
self-determination to its logical consequences. % e following sections will 
establish that this lacking implementation is essentially based on lingering 
stereotypes concerning gender nonconformity. 
 2.2.2.1. Continued Pathologisation of Trans Minors 124 
 Since the entry into force of the 2017 GRA, 16- and 17-year-old minors have 
e ectively been able to apply for legal gender recognition. Although the 
procedure is essentially the same as for adult applicants, the minor applicant 
has to hand over a declaration 125 by a child and adolescent psychiatrist that 
one has the necessary understanding to have the continuing conviction that 
the sex registered in the birth certi& cate is not in congruence with the inner 
experienced gender identity. According to the parliamentary preparatory 
works, this interference by a psychiatrist has no diagnostic aim, 126 yet serves 
to a;  rm the minor ’ s  capacity to have the continuing conviction that the inner 
experienced gender identity is not in congruence with the sex registered in the 
birth certi& cate. 127 Moreover, as with any legal act performed by a minor, the 
registrar who receives a minor ’ s application for legal gender recognition must 
check whether the minor has the necessary understanding to grasp the legal and 
administrative consequences of that act. 128 
 % e necessary psychiatric assessment of the minor ’ s cognitive capacity to have 
the conviction that there is incongruence between their registered sex and gender 
identity is motivated by the  ‘ far-reaching ’  legal and administrative consequences 
of the amendment of the registered sex. 129 However, there is no enumeration of 
what these consequences are, or why they are necessarily  ‘ far-reaching ’, especially 
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in comparison with a change of the minor ’ s & rst name, 130 which is possible at 
age twelve. In any case, given its purely legal and administrative motivation, a 
psychiatrist assessment appears to be impertinent and disproportionate. Indeed, 
it has to be reminded that the capacity of understanding the administrative 
and legal consequences of the amendment of the registered sex is mandatorily 
checked by the registrar anyway, since the latter must be ensured that the minor 
is mentally competent to perform a legal act. 131 
 Although the age limit of sixteen for gender recognition is somewhere 
in the middle of the age requirements in the other legal gender recognition 
frameworks that are based on self-determination, 132 its discrepancy with the 
new rules regarding the change of & rst name is striking. 133 Indeed, since the 
entry into force of the 2017 GRA, children who are  twelve years or older and 
who have the conviction that their registered sex is not in congruence with their 
inner experienced gender identity may apply for a change of & rst name, when 
assisted by their parents or legal representative. Although this discrepancy is 
essentially based on a stereotypical assumption regarding the importance of 
legal sex/gender, it leads to a risk that the gender history of children will be 
disclosed in public and that minors who have changed their & rst name but not 
their registered sex would encounter administrative di;  culties. 134 As S ø rlie 
argues, this prevents twelve- to & ' een-year-old children of obtaining the greatest 
possible self-respect. 135 
Intersentia
Pieter Cannoot
38
 136  See in this regard also  E.  Bribosia and  I.  Rorive ,  ‘ Human rights integration in action: 
making equality law work for trans people in Belgium ’ in  E.  Brems (ed.),  Fragmentation 
and Integration in Human Rights Law: Users ’ Perspectives ,  Edward Elgar Publishers , 
 Cheltenham  2018 , pp. 133 – 134. 
 137  L.J.  Moore and  P.  Currah ,  ‘ Legally Sexed ’ in  R.E.  Dubrofsky and  S.A.  Magnet (eds.), 
 Feminist Surveillance Studies ,  Duke University Press ,  Durham  2015 , 74. 
 138  Research by  van den Brink indicates that this fear for increasing (identity) fraud and 
light-hearted applications for legal gender recognition were also shared by the Dutch 
legislator when diagnostic and therapeutic medical requirements for legal gender recognition 
were abolished in 2014. In order to prevent such risks, an application for legal gender 
recognition still required an  a priori (psychiatric) expert assessment. % e assessment has no 
diagnostic aim but must ensure that the person concerned has the capacity to understand 
the consequences of their actions and is fully informed. See  M.  van den Brink ,  ‘ Recht doen 
aan genderidentiteit. Evaluatie drie jaar transgenderwet in Nederland [Doing justice to 
gender identity. Evaluation three years trans law in the Netherlands] ’ ,  < https://www.wodc.nl/
binaries/2897_Volledige_Tekst_tcm28-294981.pdf > , 14 – 15. 
 % e continued pathologisation of trans minors is regrettable. Since the 
psychiatric assessment does not serve to establish whether the minor actually  has 
gender dysphoria or the conviction that their registered sex is not in conformity 
with their inner experienced gender identity, it may be argued that the condition 
not only re< ects the lingering re< ex of pathologising  trans identities , but also 
e ectively pathologises  minority as such. Moreover, the legislator was not able 
to base the requirement of a psychiatric assessment of minors, combined with 
the age requirement, on any other argument than its unsubstantiated claim 
concerning the severity of legal gender recognition for a person ’ s private life. 
 2.2.2.2. Pathologisation Becomes Paternalisation 
 Moreover, it may be argued that the pathologisation of trans persons has been 
replaced by paternalisation . Although the new procedure e ectively respects 
trans persons ’ right to bodily integrity and autonomy regarding decisions about 
medical treatment, it has upheld the irrational  ‘ fear ’ and discomfort towards 
trans experiences, 136 and anxiety about the possible inability of an identity 
document to maintain a & xed correspondence with an individual throughout 
their life span, 137 that was re< ected by the compulsory medical requirements 
under the 2007 Act on Transsexuality (i.e. gender a;  rming surgery and sterility). 
 % e government ’ s explanatory memorandum to the 2017 GRA sees 
the introduction of several so-called  ‘ guarantees ’ in the procedure of 
gender recognition as the necessary and natural complement to the trans 
depathologisation , in order to avoid not only fraud, but also  ‘ light-hearted ’ 
applications for gender recognition. 138 % roughout the procedure, several 
measures were introduced to discourage unfounded applications for amendment 
of the registered sex and to protect public order. % ese measures together amount 
to a considerable attempt by the government of paternalising the trans person 
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concerned, even though it explicitly recognised that  ‘ all individuals need to have 
maximal chances to develop into who they truly are ’. 139 
 % e measures are: 
 –  % e applicant has to point out that one has had the conviction that their 
registered sex is not in congruence with their inner experienced gender 
identity  ‘ for a long time ’. Even though the latter concept was not de& ned in 
the Act or preparatory works, it could be used by the registrar to evaluate 
the  ‘ seriousness ’ of the application. 140 In other words, at least at a theoretical 
level, the registrar was given the discretionary power to evaluate the 
applicant ’ s conviction of incongruence between legal sex and gender identity, 
solely on the basis of an unspeci& ed temporal requirement. However, the 
circular letter clarifying the scope and interpretation of the Act explicitly 
stated that the registrar does not have the power to refuse applications for 
legal gender recognition on the basis of this phrase. % is was corroborated 
by the provision in the letter of a model application that literally copies the 
Act ’ s wording. It may therefore be argued that the phrase does not have any 
legal meaning, and only serves to illustrate the legislator ’ s opinion that trans 
persons may not exercise their right to self-determination  ‘ light-heartedly ’. 
In other words, the paternalisation of trans persons lies within the law ’ s 
expressive function, not in its actual e ect; 
 –  It is not su;  cient for the trans person to make the declaration for legal gender 
recognition once; a' er a  ‘ waiting period ’ of (minimum) three to (maximum) 
six months, the declaration needs to be repeated before the registrar to prove 
that one still has the same conviction a' er reading the information brochure 
that the registrar provided a' er the & rst declaration. Although the compulsory 
 ‘ waiting period ’ was inspired by the Danish model of gender recognition, 141 
the government failed to provide any form of empirical evidence to support 
the pertinence of this requirement for avoiding  ‘ light-hearted ’ applications. 
Indeed, the obligatory waiting period of six months in Danish law was met 
with severe criticism by the trans community in Denmark, 142 that saw in the 
requirement the perpetuation of the misconception of trans people as being 
 ‘ confused ’ about their gender. 143 Moreover, the requirement of a waiting 
period of several months is not shared by other countries that introduced 
a model of legal gender recognition based on self-determination, except for 
Argentina; 
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Limitations of Expanding Government Recognition of Gender Identity and the Possibility 
of Genderless Identity Documents ’ ( 2016 )  39  Harvard Journal of Law  & Gender ,  491 , 508. 
See in this regard also  L.J.  Moore and  P.  Currah ,  ‘ Legally Sexed ’ in  R.E.  Dubrofsky and 
 S.A.  Magnet (eds.),  Feminist Surveillance Studies ,  Duke University Press ,  Durham  2015 , 
p. 72. 
 148  L.  Mottet ,  ‘ Modernizing State Vital Statistics Statutes and Policies to Ensure Accurate 
Gender Markers on Birth Certi& cates: A Good Government Approach to Recognizing the 
Lives of Transgender People ’ ( 2013 )  19  Michigan Journal of Gender  & Law ,  373 , 414. See 
in this regard also  H.  Lau ,  ‘ Gender Recognition as a Human Right ’ in  A.  Von Arnauld , 
 K.  Odendahl and  M.  Susi (eds.),   e Cambridge Handbook on New Human Rights: 
Recognition, Novelty, Rhetoric ,  Cambridge University Press ,  Cambridge  2020 . 
 149  See  M. van den  Brink ,  ‘ Recht doen aan genderidentiteit. Evaluatie drie jaar transgenderwet 
in Nederland [Doing justice to gender identity. Evaluation three years trans law in the 
Netherlands] ’  < https://www.wodc.nl/binaries/2897_Volledige_Tekst_tcm28-294981.pdf > , 48. 
 150  A.  S ø rlie ,  ‘ Legal Gender Meets Reality: A Socio-Legal Children ’ s Perspective ’ in  A.  Hellum 
(ed.),  Human Rights, Sexual Orientation, and Gender Identity ,  Routledge ,  London  2017 , 
p. 100. 
 –  During the minimum  ‘ waiting period ’ of three months, the Public 
Prosecutor may issue positive advice or negative advice for reasons of public 
order. In the absence of any advice within the period of three months, the 
advice is considered to be positive. As mentioned above, according to the 
parliamentary preparatory works, the Public Prosecutor ’ s interference is 
essentially aimed at preventing the commitment of identity fraud , e.g. by 
persons who are the object of an arrest warrant, 144 or by potential terrorists. 145 
However, it remains unclear to what extent the Public Prosecutor can 
accurately detect an application with a fraudulent intention, given the fact 
that  – in a procedure based on self-determination  – the applicant does not 
have to substantiate the declaration with evidence from the personal sphere 
to support the conviction of incongruence between the registered sex and 
their gender identity. 146 Moreover, the government failed to substantiate 
their presumption that a procedure of legal gender recognition based on 
self-determination would become inherently vulnerable to fraud . 147 A' er 
all, persons who are allegedly < eeing from justice arguably attract more 
attention when taking on some form of gender nonconforming behaviour, 148 
given the lingering societal marginalisation of trans persons. 149 Further, the 
risk of exploitation of rights is minor, considering that few rights or duties 
are gender speci& c, and that going against the cisnormativity of society is 
probably more di;  cult than what is involved in amending legal gender. 150 
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 151  Parl.Doc. Chamber of representatives, 54-2403/001, 58. 
 152  H.  Lau ,  ‘ Gender Recognition as a Human Right ’ in  A.  Von Arnauld ,  K.  Odendahl and 
 M.  Susi (eds.),   e Cambridge Handbook on New Human Rights: Recognition, Novelty, 
Rhetoric ,  Cambridge University Press ,  Cambridge  2020 . 
 153  M.D.  Levasseur ,  ‘ Gender Identity De& nes Sex: Updating the Law to Re< ect Modern Medical 
Science is Key to Transgender Rights ’ ( 2014 – 15 )  Vermont Law Review ,  39 , 996. 
 154  Parl.Doc. Chamber of representatives, 54-2403/001, 22. 
 155  Ibid, 22. Note that the protection of the non-disposability, truthfulness and coherence of 
the civil status is accepted by the ECtHR as a legitimate aim to limit self-determination 
regarding legal gender recognition. See  ECtHR  6 April 2017 ,  79885/12, 52471/13, 52596/13, 
 A.P., Gar ç on and Nicot v. France , para. 142. However, importantly, in a 2017 ruling, the 
German Constitutional Court denounced the importance of the role of gender for a person ’ s 
civil status. 
 156  Parl.Doc. Chamber of representatives, 54-2403/001, 22. 
 157  See in this regard also  L.  Mottet ,  ‘ Modernizing State Vital Statistics Statutes and Policies to 
Ensure Accurate Gender Markers on Birth Certi& cates: A Good Government Approach to 
Recognizing the Lives of Transgender People ’ ( 2013 )  19  Michigan Journal of Gender  & Law , 
 373 , 416. See also  E.  Bribosia and  I.  Rorive ,  ‘ Human rights integration in action: making 
equality law work for trans people in Belgium ’ in  E.  Brems (ed.),  Fragmentation and Integration 
% is friction between the underlying principle of self-determination and 
the interference by the Public Prosecutor was also noted by the Council 
of State in its advice to Parliament. 151 Besides, governments are arguably 
able to link previous personal information to current personal information 
in their so' ware, so that criminal records are automatically transferred in 
case of legal gender recognition. 152 In any case, by explicitly linking legal 
gender recognition based on self-determination to fraud, the legislature sent 
a message that there is something inherently < awed about a trans person ’ s 
existence; 153 
 –  % e cornerstone of the  ‘ guarantees ’ against fraud and/or  ‘ light-hearted ’ 
applications was the principle of the irreversibility of legal gender recognition . 
In other words, the amendment of the registered sex was considered to be 
de& nitive, except for  ‘ exceptional circumstances ’. If such circumstances 
could be proved by the person concerned, the family court could reinstall 
the  ‘ original ’ legal sex. Every following request for legal gender recognition 
by that same person had to be based on this strict judicial procedure. 154 
% e government motivated this principled irreversibility of legal gender 
recognition on the basis of the need to avoid that a person  ‘ regularly ’ applies for 
an amendment of one ’ s registered  ‘ sex ’, given the principled non-disposability 
of the civil status. 155 Indeed, according to the government,  ‘ reversibility 
would lead to a missing sense of seriousness among potential applicants  – 
who need to seriously re< ect on the matter of legal gender recognition ’. 156 % e 
level of paternalism towards trans persons in the government ’ s reasoning is 
striking, especially considering the total absence of any form of qualitative or 
quantitative evidence to support their claim of the harm that gender < uidity 
would pose to society or that gender < uidity would regularly occur. 157 
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in Human Rights Law: Users ’ Perspectives ,  Edward Elgar Publishers ,  Cheltenham  2018 , 
p. 134. Research by  van den Brink has shown that, even when legal gender recognition 
is easily reversible, the number of reversions remains low. See  M. van den  Brink ,  ‘ Recht 
doen aan genderidentiteit. Evaluatie drie jaar transgenderwet in Nederland [Doing justice to 
gender identity. Evaluation three years trans law in the Netherlands] ’  < https://www.wodc.nl/
binaries/2897_Volledige_Tekst_tcm28-294981.pdf > , 19. 
 158  % is continuing binary normativity in the Belgian sex/gender registration system will be 
more thoroughly dealt with below. 
 159  Note that in September 2019, the Antwerp family court ordered to reverse gender 
recognition based on this ground. See Rechtbank Antwerpen [Tribunal Antwerp] (Belgium) 
16 September 2019, 19/1297/B. 
 160  See in this regard also  L.J.  Moore and  P.  Currah ,  ‘ Legally Sexed ’ in  R.E.  Dubrofsky 
and  S.A.  Magnet (eds.),  Feminist Surveillance Studies ,  Duke University Press ,  Durham  2015 , 
pp. 70 – 71. 
 161  H.  Lau ,  ‘ Gender Recognition as a Human Right ’ in  A.  Von Arnauld ,  K.  Odendahl and 
 M.  Susi (eds.),   e Cambridge Handbook on New Human Rights: Recognition, Novelty, Rhetoric , 
 Cambridge University Press ,  Cambridge  2020 . See in this regard also  A.  S ø rlie ,  ‘ Legal Gender 
Meets Reality: A Socio-Legal Children ’ s Perspective ’ in  A.  Hellum (ed.),  Human Rights, 
Sexual Orientation, and Gender Identity ,  Routledge ,  London  2017 , pp. 100 – 101. 
Moreover, the government failed to provide any legal and/or administrative 
motive that is speci& cally related to the necessity of the irreversible nature 
of sex/gender registration. It thus appears that the government did not 
question their own stereotype regarding the self-evident importance of 
sex/gender registration and its innate form. 158 % is conclusion is corroborated 
by the examples of  ‘ exceptional circumstances ’ given in the preparatory works, 
i.e. the experience of transphobia 159 and a decline of well-being. Besides the 
cynical message that the solution to an experience of discrimination would 
consist of reversing one ’ s  ‘ coming out ’, it was not foreseen that a person may 
argue that their self-de& ned gender identity has evolved over time, despite the 
Act ’ s underlying principle of self-determination . % e principled irreversibility 
of legal gender recognition thus served the same goal of preserving the 
seemingly necessary permanence of the amendment of the registered sex as 
the previous medical requirements did. 160 Moreover, on a more pragmatic 
note, the principled irreversibility of legal gender recognition also a ected 
the legitimacy of sex/gender registration. Indeed, by excluding the possibility 
of any natural < uidity in gender identity, the individual ’ s right to personal 
autonomy was not only compromised, but the usefulness of the sex/gender 
marker was also strongly diminished, increasing the likelihood of false 
negatives. 161 % e principled irreversibility of an amendment of registered 
sex was found unconstitutional by the Belgian Constitutional Court in its 
judgment of 19 June 2019. % e Court considered that, given the right to 
gender self-determination , the di erential treatment between gender < uid 
persons and persons who do not experience < uidity in gender (identity) not 
justi& ed in light of the legislator ’ s aim to prevent fraud and  ‘ light-hearted ’ 
applications for legal gender recognition. According to the Court, it was 
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 162  % e Court did not evaluate the pertinence and proportionality of these administrative 
measures, since this was not part of the applicant ’ s claim. 
 163  Grondwettelijk Hof [Constitutional Court] (Belgium) 19 June 2019, 99/2019, para. B.8.4-8.9. 
 164  See in this regard also  F.R.  Ammaturo ,  European Sexual Citizenship. Human Rights, Bodies 
and Identities ,  Palgrave ,  London  2017 , pp. 73 – 74. See also  L.J.  Moore and  P.  Currah , 
 ‘ Legally Sexed ’ in  R.E.  Dubrofsky and  S.A.  Magnet (eds.),  Feminist Surveillance Studies , 
 Duke University Press ,  Durham  2015 , pp. 68 – 70. 
 165  See in this regard also  S.  Katyal ,  ‘ % e  Numerus Clausus of Sex ’ ( 2017 )   e University of 
Chicago Law Review ,  399 , 410. 
 166  See in this regard also  L.  Mottet ,  ‘ Modernizing State Vital Statistics Statutes and Policies to 
Ensure Accurate Gender Markers on Birth Certi& cates: A Good Government Approach to 
Recognizing the Lives of Transgender People ’ ( 2013 )  19  Michigan Journal of Gender  & Law , 
 373 , 417. 
 167  E.  Bribosia ,  N.  Gallus and  I.  Rorive ,  ‘ Une nouvelle loi pour les personnes transgenres en 
Belgique [A new law for transgender persons in Belgium] ’ ( 2018 )  137  Journal des Tribunaux , 
 261 , 266. 
 168  S.  Katyal ,  ‘ % e  Numerus Clausus of Sex ’ ( 2017 )  84   e University of Chicago Law Review , 
 399 , 423. 
 169  P.  Currah ,  ‘ Gender Pluralisms under the Transgender Umbrella ’ in  P.  Currah , 
 R.M.  Juang and  S.  Price Minter (eds.),  Transgender Rights ,  University of Minnesota Press , 
 Minneapolis  2006 , p. 24. 
not evident how the measures to prevent fraud and  ‘ light-hearted ’ decisions in 
the basic procedure were not su;  cient in cases of a new (second, third, fourth  … ) 
application for legal gender recognition. 162 As the Court pointed out, the civil 
registry and Public Prosecutor would be perfectly aware of the fact that legal 
gender recognition had already been granted in the past. 163 
 In order to avoid fraud and/or  ‘ light-hearted ’ applications for legal gender 
recognition, the legislator thus introduced paternalising  ‘ guarantees ’ that are 
considered to be naturally complementary to a system of self-determination, 
but in essence strive to achieve the same goals that the pathologising conditions 
tried to do: reserving the procedure of legal gender recognition for  ‘ true ’ trans 
persons, 164 and maintaining the & xed and binary nature of the legal sex/gender 
registration. 165 Nevertheless, the government ’ s motives are essentially based on 
stereotypes , that have no support in quantitative or qualitative evidence 166 and 
therefore amount to an unjusti& ed interference of the trans person ’ s right to 
personal autonomy. 167 % us, although pathologising conditions for legal gender 
recognition were removed, the Act and its preparatory works still re< ect the 
presumption that there is something  ‘ abnormal ’ with gender nonconforming 
identities and behaviour which justi& es paternalising trans persons. 168 
 Even though the principled irreversibility of legal gender recognition will 
now be removed from Article 135/1, the paternalising stereotypes are not the 
only ones that are still lingering in the 2017 GRA and the o;  cial sex/gender 
registration system taken as a whole. Indeed, according to the current Belgian 
legal system, sex is binary and biologically transparent, and gender identity maps 
easily and predictably onto sex. 169 % e next sections will therefore successively 
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 170  See in this regard  A.J. Neuman  Wipfler ,  ‘ Identity Crisis: % e Limitations of Expanding 
Government Recognition of Gender Identity and the Possibility of Genderless Identity 
Documents ’ ( 2016 )  39  Harvard Journal of Law  & Gender ,  491 , 522. 
 171  See in this regard also  H.G.  Beh and  M.  Diamond ,  ‘ Individuals with Di erences in Sex 
Development: Consult to Colombia Constitutional Court Regarding Sex and Gender ’ ( 2014 ) 
 29  Wisconsin Journal of Law, Gender  & Society ,  421 , 422. 
 172  See in this regard also  S.  Katyal ,  ‘ % e  Numerus Clausus of Sex ’ ( 2017 )  84   e University of 
Chicago Law Review ,  399 , 391. 
 173  F.R.  Ammaturo ,  European Sexual Citizenship. Human Rights, Bodies and Identities ,  Palgrave , 
 London  2017 , p. 69. 
 174  Arts. 43 and 44 of the Civil Code. 
 175  See in this regard also  B.  Vanderhorst ,  ‘ Wither Lies the Self: Intersex and Transgender 
Individuals and A Proposal for Brain-Based Legal Sex ’ ( 2015 )  9  Harvard Law  & Policy 
Review ,  241 , 242. 
address the cis- and binary normativity of the o;  cial Belgian sex/gender 
registration system and establish the limitations to the recognition of gender 
self-determination when introduced in a stereotyped legal system. 
 2.3.  CISNORMATIVITY : CONFLATION BETWEEN SEX 
AND GENDER (IDENTITY) 
 It is interesting to note that the paradigm shi'  in o;  cial sex/gender registration 
towards self-determination has rede& ned  ‘ sex ’ from a legal category based on a 
person ’ s bodily sex characteristics (especially external genitalia) to a category 
based on that person ’ s self-de& ned gender identity. 170 However, it may be argued 
that the law  – at all possible levels  – is still characterised by a strong con< ation 
between  ‘ sex ’ and  ‘ gender identity ’. 171 % e con< ation, on the basis of which it 
is legitimate to assume that a person who is born with male sex characteristics 
has/will develop a male gender identity and a person who is born with female 
sex characteristics has/will develop a female gender identity, is also referred to as 
the  ‘ cisnormativity ’ of society and the law. 172 Nevertheless, as Ammaturo points 
out, the pervasive and imperative character of these gender norms, as well as the 
severity with which they are enforced, is derived from a fundamentally shaky 
basis on which they rest. 173 
 % e law ’ s cisnormative nature is best evidenced by the o;  cial sex/gender 
registration system and the administrative procedure of legal gender recognition . 
As mentioned above, in the Belgian framework of sex registration every 
child is assigned a legal sex at birth, upon declaration to the registrar. 174 % e 
assignation of either the  ‘ male ’ or  ‘ female ’ sex is based on a super& cial check of 
the newborn ’ s genitals at birth by a medical practitioner. However, whilst the 
o;  cial registration at birth is clearly based on the biological composition of the 
newborn child, it also stereotypically presupposes  – at least in the legal sense  – 
congruence between that person ’ s sex and gender identity. 175 
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 176  However, it is usually o;  cially still called registered  ‘ sex ’ . 
 177  See in this regard also  G.  Verschelden ,  ‘ Vernietigingsberoepen tegen de Transgenderwet: 
aanloop naar of valkuil voor de non-binaire genderoptie ? [Actions for annulment against 
the Transgender law: build-up to or pitfall for non-binary gender option ? ] ’ ( 2018 )  Tijdschri#  
voor Familierecht ,  66 – 68 . 
 178  % e gender identity registration will indeed still be used for aims related to a person ’ s 
biological composition, such as preventive cancer screenings. 
 % e law ’ s cisnormativity is also explicitly evidenced by the procedure and 
consequences of legal gender recognition. It should be su;  ciently clear by 
now that on the basis of legal gender recognition, it is possible to have one ’ s 
legal sex marker amended in light of one ’ s gender identity. Upon completion 
of such procedure, this registered gender identity 176 becomes the sole source 
of information regarding that person ’ s sex/gender, and therefore the sole sex/
gender marker  for all possible aims that are related to sex/gender. In other 
words, as has been argued above, sex registration actually has to be perceived as 
registration of gender identity. However, completing a procedure of legal gender 
recognition does not of itself end the abovementioned con< ation between sex 
and gender identity in law. Neither does legal gender recognition necessarily 
change the law ’ s cisnormative nature, as is evidenced by the 2017 GRA. 
 As mentioned above, the 2007 Act on Transsexuality required invasive 
medical conditions for legal gender recognition, i.e. gender a;  rming surgery and 
compulsory sterility. % e 2007 Act therefore strongly adhered to cisnormativity 
in its most literal form by requiring  – as far as medically possible  – physical 
congruence between the trans person ’ s sex characteristics and gender identity. 
While the (preparatory works to the) 2017 GRA recognised the human rights 
violations stemming from the obligatory medical conditions for legal gender 
recognition, the law ’ s cisnormativity was not challenged. Even though the 
Belgian registration framework has conceptually overhauled the pervasive 
misconception that genitals form the standard for legal gender assignment, 
stereotypes still persist. 
 Indeed, it may be argued that the law ’ s stereotypical cisnormative character 
was upheld by the 2017 Gender Recognition Act, albeit more clearly in the form 
of a legal & ction than before. Whilst  at birth all registered persons are legally 
considered to have/develop a gender identity that is in conformity with their 
sex characteristics, this cisnormative presumption 177 is e ectively altered in 
the administrative procedure of legal gender recognition. A' er all, persons 
who apply for gender recognition will be legally considered to have a body that 
is in congruence with their declared gender identity. 178 In other words, since 
the direction of the presumption is  reversed , it may be argued that the 2017 
GRA installed a system of  ‘ reversed cisnormativity ’, whilst not ending the 
cisnormative registration system at birth. % e Act is therefore indicative of what 
Intersentia
Pieter Cannoot
46
 179  S.  Katyal ,  ‘ % e  Numerus Clausus of Sex ’ ( 2017 )  84   e University of Chicago Law Review , 
 399 , 397. 
 180  A.  S ø rlie ,  ‘ Legal Gender Meets Reality: A Socio-Legal Children ’ s Perspective ’ in  A.  Hellum 
(ed.),  Human Rights, Sexual Orientation, and Gender Identity ,  Routledge ,  London  2017 , p. 78. 
 181  H.H.G.  Beh and  M.  Diamond ,  ‘ Individuals with Di erences in Sex Development: Consult to 
Colombia Constitutional Court Regarding Sex and Gender ’ ( 2014 )  29  Wisconsin Journal of 
Law, Gender  & Society ,  421 , 443. 
 182  J.M.  Scherpe and  P.  Dunne ,  ‘ Comparative Analysis and Recommendations ’ in  J.M.  Scherpe 
(ed.),   e Legal Status of Transgender and Transsexual Persons ,  Intersentia ,  Cambridge  2014 , 
pp. 615 – 663. 
 183  See in this regard  J.  Dolgin ,  ‘ Discriminating gender: legal, medical, and social presumptions 
about transgender and intersex people ’ ( 2018 )  47  Southwestern Law Review ,  61 , 90. See also 
 P.  Dunne and  J.  Mulder ,  ‘ Beyond the Binary: Towards a % ird Sex Category in Germany ? ’ 
( 2018 )  19  German Law Journal ,  627 , 636. 
 184  C.  Simon ,  ‘ Au-del à du binaire: penser le genre, la loi et le droit des personnes transgenres en 
Belgique ’ ( 2016 )  28  Canadian Journal of Women and the Law ,  521 , 528. 
Katyal calls the  ‘ silent con< ict ’ of two relatively vast stand-alone regimes in law: 
one that recognises the constructed dimensions of identity, and another that 
largely requires the existence of these identities  – both virtual and real  – for its 
regulatory functions to function successfully. 179 
 % is cisnormativity is especially challenging for minors who experience 
some form of gender nonconformity and who are unable to have access to legal 
gender recognition. As mentioned above, the GRA only opened the procedure 
of legal gender recognition to 16- and 17-year-olds. Consequently, for younger 
trans minors who (at least temporarily) experience a mismatch between 
their registered sex and their gender identity and who do not have access to 
any remedy, their registered sex becomes a challenging obstacle. 180 % is early 
rush to legally label children on the basis of a cisnormative stereotype makes it 
more di;  cult for the trans child to accept the gender identity that emerges. 181 
Scherpe and Dunne therefore argue that  ‘ where a child must bear the burden of 
incongruent identity documents, that individual will be subjected to continuous 
 ‘ outings ’, where their transgender history is involuntarily revealed to others and 
where they may be exposed to bullying, social discrimination and, in extreme 
cases, transphobic violence ’. 182 
 2.4. BINARY NORMATIVITY 
 Probably an even more radical challenge for the law than tackling its cisnormative 
nature, is the recognition and accommodation of non-binary (trans) persons. 183 
As mentioned above, the present Belgian sex/gender registration framework 
currently self-evidently only recognises a rigid dichotomy of  ‘ male ’ and 
 ‘ female ’, 184 both at birth and in the context of legal gender recognition. However, 
research has established that a person ’ s gender identity/expression needs to 
Intersentia 47
% e Limits to Gender Self-Determination in a Stereotyped Legal System
be conceptualised as a continuum with the  ‘ male ’ and  ‘ female ’ gender at both 
ends of the spectrum respectively. In between are  ‘ non-binary ’,  ‘ genderqueer ’, or 
 ‘ genderfuck ’ persons , who may identify as neither male, nor female, as both male 
and female, or as di erent genders at di erent times. Moreover, importantly, some 
persons might even resist acknowledging the existence of (a) gender identity in 
the & rst place. 185 Nevertheless, as Katyal argues, the law ’ s commitment to gender 
standardisation has essentially foreclosed alternative, i.e. non-binary, modes 
of identi& cation and excluded those who fall outside of the  numerus clausus of 
sex/gender. 186 According to the author, this  numerus clausus serves to shoehorn 
other types of gender identity into male or female, irrespective of the complex 
human reality. 187 Indeed, laws that assume a binary model of gender, cannot 
claim to be universally applicable. 188 
 2.4.1. Right to (Legal Recognition of) Non-Binary Gender Identity 
 According to Lau, if the law is to take the abovementioned right to (recognition 
of) gender identity on the basis of personal autonomy/self-determination 
seriously, it ought to grant individuals the ability to place their gender identity 
outside the binary. 189 % is conclusion is reinforced by an emerging attention in 
several instruments of international (so' ) law for non-binary gender identity. 190 
Indeed, as mentioned above, Yogyakarta Principle 31 calls for States to make 
available a multiplicity of gender marker options. In its Resolution 2048 (2015), 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe also already suggested 
to the Member States to  consider broadening registration categories with a 
 third gender option for those who seek it. 191 % e Assembly strengthened this 
recommendation in Resolution 2191 (2017), in which it explicitly called on the 
 185  See in this regard also  C.  Simon ,  ‘ Au-del à du binaire: penser le genre, la loi et le droit 
des personnes transgenres en Belgique ’ ( 2016 )  28  Canadian Journal of Women and the Law , 
 521 , 545. 
 186  S.  Katyal ,  ‘ % e  Numerus Clausus of Sex ’ ( 2017 )  84   e University of Chicago Law Review , 
 399 , 404, 410. 
 187  Ibid, 399, 408. 
 188  T.  Dreyfus ,  ‘ % e  “ Half-Invention ” of Gender identity in International Human Rights Law: 
From CEDAW to the Yogyakarta Principles ’ ( 2012 )  37   e Australian Feminist Law Journal ,  36 . 
 189  H.  Lau ,  ‘ Gender Recognition as a Human Right ’ in  A.  Von Arnauld ,  K.  Odendahl and 
 M.  Susi (eds.),   e Cambridge Handbook on New Human Rights: Recognition, Novelty, 
Rhetoric ,  Cambridge University Press ,  Cambridge  2020 . See in this regard also  S.  Katyal , 
 ‘ % e  Numerus Clausus of Sex ’ ( 2017 )  84   e University of Chicago Law Review ,  399 , 408. 
 190  However, note that a binary conceptualisation of gender identity is still widespread in 
(international) human rights law. See in this regard  T.  Dreyfus ,  ‘ % e  “ Half-Invention ” 
of Gender identity in International Human Rights Law: From CEDAW to the Yogyakarta 
Principles ’ ( 2012 )  37   e Australian Feminist Law Journal ,  33 , 37. 
 191  Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly ,  ‘ Resolution 2048 (2015)  “ Discrimination against 
transgender people in Europe ” ’,  < http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-EN.
asp?& leid=21736 > , para. 6.2.4. 
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States to  ensure ,  wherever gender classi/ cations are in use by public authorities , 
that  a range of options are available for all people. 192 In other words, according 
to the Parliamentary Assembly, a single third option for gender recognition 
(e.g.  ‘ X ’ ) would no longer be su;  cient to meet the requirements stemming from 
the right to self-determination. % is reference to a  ‘ range of options ’ also seems 
to be in conformity with the scope of Yogyakarta Principle 3, which holds that 
 [ … ] persons of  diverse [ … ]  gender identities shall enjoy legal capacity in all aspects of 
life. 193 Each person ’ s  self-de/ ned [ … ] gender identity is integral to their personality 
and is one of the most basic aspects of self-determination, dignity and freedom. 
[ … ] States shall [ … ] fully respect and legally recognise each person ’ s self-de& ned 
gender identity [ … ] and ensure that procedures exist whereby all State-issued identity 
papers which indicate a person ’ s gender/sex  – including birth certi& cates, passports, 
electoral records and other documents  – re< ect the person ’ s profound  self-de/ ned 
gender identity [ … ]. 194 
 According to Otto, this necessary recognition of diversity of gender identity in 
law may also be deduced from Article 5(a) of the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW ), which requires States 
to take the appropriate measures to 
 modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to 
achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which 
are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on 
stereotyped roles for men and women. 195 
 Despite the provision ’ s dualistic language, she argues that  ‘ fully recognising the 
social and cultural nature of gender practices and stereotypes [ … ] leads to the 
conclusion that gender (identity) can be experienced and/or perceived as < uid 
 192  Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly ,  ‘ Resolution 2191 (2017)  “ Promoting 
the human rights of and eliminating discrimination against intersex people ” ’,  < http://
assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?& leid=24232&lang=en > , para. 7.3.3. 
Resolution 2191 (2017) also called on the Member States to consider making the sex 
registration on birth certi& cates and other identity documents optional for all people. 
 193  However,  Otto argues that the concept of  ‘ gender (identity) ’ in the Yogyakarta Principles 
is actually con& ned to the  ‘ male ’ / ’ female ’ dualism, and that the Principles therefore fail to 
fundamentally challenge the existing stereotypical dichotomous gender categories in human rights 
law. See  D.  Otto ,  ‘ Queering Gender [Identity] in International Law ’ in  A.  Hellum (ed.), 
 Human Rights, Sexual Orientation, and Gender Identity ,  Routledge ,  London  2017 , p. 38. 
 194  See in this regard also  M. van den  Brink and  J.  Tighelaar ,  ‘ M/V en verder. Sekseregistratie 
door de overheid en de juridische positie van transgenders [M/F and beyond. Sex registration 
by the government and the legal position of transgender persons] ’ ,  < https://www.wodc.nl/
binaries/2393-volledige-tekst_tcm28-73312.pdf > , 39. 
 195  Art. 5(a) of the CEDAW. 
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and potentially multiplicitous, constrained only by its historical and cultural 
context ’. 196 
 Importantly, in 2017 the German Constitutional Court 
( ‘ Bundesverfassungsgericht ’ ) adopted a landmark ruling in which it held that 
the binary normativity ( ‘ male ’  –  ‘ female ’ ) of the o;  cial sex/gender registration 
violated the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex/gender identity 
 ex Article 3(3) of the German Constitution, 197 as well as the constitutionally 
guaranteed right to personality of non-binary persons (with variations of sex 
characteristics). 198 In the judgment, the Court struck down the self-evidence 
of the binary conceptualisation of sex/gender in the law as it pointed out that 
the German constitutional order did not require civil status to be exclusively 
binary in terms of sex/gender, nor was opposed to the civil status recognition 
of a third marker beyond male and female. % is reasoning closely resembles 
a statement made by the Belgian Constitutional Court back in 2004. Even 
though the case at hand did not deal with issues related to trans persons or 
the legal recognition of gender identity, the Constitutional Court held that a 
 ‘ fundamental sex/gender binarity ’ could not be seen as a general principle of 
the Belgian constitutional order. 199 In June 2018, the Austrian Constitutional 
Court ( ‘ Verfassungsgerichtshof ’ ) adopted a ruling in which it considered the 
absence of any form of recognition of non-binary gender identities incompatible 
with the right to gender self-determination under Article 8 of the ECHR. 200 
A comparable judgment was delivered by the Dutch tribunal of & rst instance of 
 196  D.  Otto ,  ‘ Queering Gender [Identity] in International Law ’ in  A.  Hellum (ed.),  Human 
Rights, Sexual Orientation, and Gender Identity ,  Routledge ,  London  2017 , p. 27. See in this 
regard also  R.  Holtmaat ,  ‘ % e CEDAW: A Holistic Approach to Women ’ s Equality and 
Freedom ’ in  A.  Hellum and  H. Sindin  Aasen (eds.),  Women ’ s Human Rights: CEDAW in 
International, Regional and National Law ,  Cambridge University Press ,  Cambridge  2013 , 
pp. 115 – 116. 
 197  Bundesverfassungsgericht [Constitutional Court] (Germany) 10 October 2017, 2019/16. 
 198  In August 2018, the German federal Cabinet released a legislative proposal to implement the 
judgment. % e government chose to give a narrow reading to the judgment ’ s scope, by limiting 
the introduction of a third gender option  ‘ diverse ’ ( ‘ divers ’ ) to persons with variations of sex 
characteristics. See  < https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/kurzmeldungen/DE/2018/08/
geburtenregister.html > . On the basis of the proposal, all persons who apply for the third 
option must substantiate their request with a medical certi& cate or an a;  davit con& rming 
a variation of sex characteristics. % e proposal was adopted by the federal Parliament on 
14 December 2018. % is  ‘ re-pathologisation ’ of persons with variations of sex characteristics, 
as well as the under-inclusiveness of the proposed procedure were immediately heavily 
criticised by activists and scholars. See, for instance,  G.  Baars ,  ‘ New German Intersex Law: 
% ird Gender but not as we want it ’ ,  < https://verfassungsblog.de/new-german-intersex-law-
third-gender-but-not-as-we-want-it/ > . % e contribution by Jens T. % eilen in this book 
thoroughly deals with the judgment and the legislative process that followed. 
 199  Grondwettelijk Hof [Constitutional Court] (Belgium) 20 October 2004, 159/2004, 
para. B.5.6. 
 200  Verfassungsgerichtshof [Constitutional Court] (Austria) 15 June 2018, G 77/2018-9. 
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Limburg (Roermond). 201 However, the UK High Court of Justice and Court of 
Appeal held that  – in the absence of a convincing international trend  – no right 
to non-binary recognition could be deduced from Article 8 of the ECHR. 202 
 Over the last decade, various governments have also begun to acknowledge 
the complexity of gender identity as bodily anatomy and identity have become 
less presumptively linked. 203 In a limited, yet increasing number of countries 
worldwide, 204 a non-binary form of sex/gender registration  has already been 
introduced in the registration system, predominantly by providing a third 
option (mostly  ‘ X ’ or  ‘ other ’ ) next to  ‘ male ’ and  ‘ female ’. Some of these examples 
concern the o;  cial registration in civil registers  – comparable to the Belgian 
model  – , whilst others deal with the indication of one ’ s sex/gender on o;  cial 
identi& cation documents, such as an international passport, identity card or 
driver ’ s licence. 
 2.4.2.   e 2017 Gender Recognition Act 
 % e 2017 GRA did not end the binary normativity of the Belgian sex/gender 
registration system. Indeed, while the parliamentary preparatory works referred 
to the dominant international human rights law standards to support the 
depathologisation of trans persons, they ignored the call for the inclusion of 
gender non-binarity in law by those same instruments. Although it may be 
argued that there was no political will to end the binary normativity of Belgian 
law, and trying to force a third gender option in the proposal for the 2017 GRA 
could have resulted in parliamentary obstruction, the ignorance for the legal 
position of non-binary persons was di;  cult to reconcile with the government ’ s 
aim to o er all individuals maximal chances to develop into who they truly 
are. 205 Besides, the non-recognition of non-binary persons in law stood at odds 
with the federal government ’ s own policy to use  ‘ M/F/X ’ in vacancy notices, in 
order to attract all potential candidates, including non-binary persons. 206 
 In June 2019, the Belgian Constitutional Court considered the absence 
of any form of recognition of non-binary persons in the Act a violation of 
 201  Rechtbank Limburg [Tribunal Limburg] (the Netherlands) 28 May 2018, ECLI:NL:RBLIM:
2018:4931. 
 202  High Court of Justice (United Kingdom) 22 June 2018, CO/2704/2017; Court of Appeal (civil 
division) 10 March 2020, R on the application of Christie Elan-Cane v. Secretary of State for the 
Home Department, EWCA Civ 363. 
 203  A.J. Neuman  Wipfler ,  ‘ Identity Crisis: % e Limitations of Expanding Government 
Recognition of Gender Identity and the Possibility of Genderless Identity Documents ’ ( 2016 ) 
 39  Harvard Journal of Law  & Gender ,  491 . 
 204  % ese countries include,  inter alia , Australia, New-Zealand, India, Canada, Malta, Denmark, 
Iceland, and the US States of Oregon, California and Washington. 
 205  Parl.Doc. Chamber of representatives, 54-2403/004, 9. 
 206  See  < http://www.selor.be/nl/nieuws/2015/12/mv-wordt-mvx-federale-overheid-wil-meer-
genderneutraliteit-in-vacatures/ > . 
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the constitutional right to equality, read together with the right to gender 
self-determination  ex Article 8 of the ECHR and Article 22 of the Constitution. 207 
% e Court held that persons with a binary gender identity and persons with a 
non-binary gender identity are comparable categories. In light of the right to 
gender self-determination and the legislature ’ s aim to give all persons maximal 
chances to be who they really are, it did not consider the binary or non-binary 
nature of one ’ s gender identity a pertinent criterion for di erential treatment 
in procedures of legal gender recognition. Indeed, both binary and non-binary 
persons have the same interest in not being obliged to have identity documents 
that do not correspond to their experienced reality. Concurring with the 
German Constitutional Court, the Court considered the fact that breaking the 
sex/gender binary would lead to additional legal changes, no justi& cation for the 
di erential treatment. Re< ecting the ECtHR ’ s statement in  Christine Goodwin 
v. United Kingdom , it held that society may be expected to tolerate certain 
inconveniences to allow all persons to live a life in dignity in conformity with 
their gender identity. % e Court also again held that the Belgian constitutional 
order did not require a binary conceptualisation of sex/gender, nor prohibited 
the adoption of positive measures to & ght inequalities on the basis of a person ’ s 
non-binary gender identity. Although it is the legislature ’ s prerogative to 
decide on how to implement the judgment, the Court already suggested some 
solutions. According to the Court, the legislature could decide to add one or 
more categories for the registration of sex and gender identity at birth and in the 
procedure of legal gender recognition or could eliminate sex and gender identity 
as elements of a person ’ s civil status. % e latter option could result in the end of 
public and compulsory sex/gender registration. 
 Ending the binary normativity of the o;  cial sex/gender registration 
framework is necessary to protect the individual ’ s right to personal autonomy and 
to ensure legal inclusivity of all persons. Moreover, it is also necessary to ensure 
accurate and inclusive government performance. A' er all, as mentioned above, 
all forms of gender normativity in registration necessarily and simultaneously 
lead to over- and under-inclusiveness of individuals, and therefore a potential 
lack of pertinence of the sex/gender marker for aspired government performance. 
However, many are critical of adding the  ‘ third box ’ to existing frameworks of 
sex/gender registration. As Neuman Wip< er argues,  ‘ shi' ing from a binary to 
a tripartite system is not necessarily a solution in and of itself, as the existence 
of a third category may do more to reinforce its predecessors than to subvert 
them ’. 208 Indeed, removing all  ‘ dubious ’ identities from the M/F categories could 
 207  Art. 22 of the Constitution holds the right to respect for private life. % e Constitutional Court 
considers Art. 22 to be an analogous provision to Art. 8 of the ECHR. 
 208  A.J. Neuman  Wipfler ,  ‘ Identity Crisis: % e Limitations of Expanding Government 
Recognition of Gender Identity and the Possibility of Genderless Identity Documents ’ ( 2016 ) 
 39  Harvard Journal of Law  & Gender ,  491 , 502. 
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ultimate lead to a reinforcement of the naturalness of the binary, resulting in 
heightened stigma towards non-binary persons. 
 % is argument of  ‘ categorical expansionism ’ 209 also does not question the 
assumed interests of the State in gender registration. 210 Indeed, an alternative 
path to respect a person ’ s right to personal autonomy regarding their gender 
identity and to ensure their inclusivity in the law could also consist of ending 
sex/gender registration altogether. A' er all, it may be argued that  ‘ as long as the 
State records gender identity, it will also police its boundaries ’. 211 According to 
van den Brink, present State practice underlines not only the  ‘ naturalness ’ of the 
binary conception of sex/gender, but also the idea that sex/gender matters, and 
 always matters. 212 However, it goes beyond the scope of this chapter to thoroughly 
address whether and to what extent a rationale for gender registration (still) 
exists, whether public, compulsory gender registration is pertinent to achieve 
those goals, and why State-issued identity documents publicly designate gender. 
 3. CONCLUSION 
 Belgium ’ s legal sex/gender framework is more respectful of the rights of trans 
persons than ever before. 213 However, the 2017 GRA did not profoundly overhaul 
the State ’ s quasi monopoly power to determine, recognise and ultimately 
administer gender identity, 214 both with regard to the original sex registration 
at birth and the procedure of legal gender recognition. Not only does the State 
take power regarding one of the most intimate aspects of a person ’ s life, it does so 
on the basis of what Katyal calls,  ‘ an inordinately messy, shi' ing, complex, and 
contradictory set of rules, demonstrating a near total absence of coherence ’. 215 
Indeed, the previous sections pointed out the inherent paternalising, innate, 
cisnormative and binary normative nature of the present Belgian o;  cial 
 209  Ibid, 491, 512. 
 210  See in this regard also ibid, 491, 521. 
 211  Ibid, 491, 543. See in this regard also  G.  Baars ,  ‘ % e Politics of Recognition and the Limits 
of Emancipation through Law ’ ,  < http://verfassungsblog.de/the-politics-of-recognition-and-
the-limits-of-emancipation-through-law/ > . 
 212  M.  van den Brink ,  ‘ “ % e Legitimate Aim of Harmonising Body and Soul ” . Changing Legal 
Gender: Family Life and Human Rights ’ in  K.  Boele-Woelki and  A.  Fuchs (eds.),  Same-Sex 
Relationships and Beyond. Gender Matters in the EU ,  Intersentia ,  Cambridge  2017 , p. 233. See 
in this regard also  D.  Cooper and  F.  Renz ,  ‘ If the state decerti& ed gender, what might happen 
to its meaning and value ? ’ ( 2016 )  43  Journal of Law and Society ,  483 , 487. 
 213  E.  Bribosia and  I.  Rorive ,  ‘ Human rights integration in action: making equality law work 
for trans people in Belgium ’ in  E.  Brems (ed.),  Fragmentation and Integration in Human 
Rights Law: Users ’ Perspectives ,  Edward Elgar Publishers ,  Cheltenham  2018 , p. 136. 
 214  S.  Katyal ,  ‘ % e  Numerus Clausus of Sex ’ ( 2017 )  84   e University of Chicago Law Review , 
 389 , 411. 
 215  Ibid, 389, 412. 
Intersentia 53
% e Limits to Gender Self-Determination in a Stereotyped Legal System
sex/gender registration framework. In this regard, the Constitutional Court 
already struck down several parts of the GRA that discriminated against gender 
< uid and non-binary persons, since the di erential treatment based on gendered 
stereotypes could not be reasonably justi& ed in light of the right to gender 
self-determination . 
 % e Belgian 2017 GRA has shown that the legal recognition of gender 
self-determination remains inherently limited when introduced into a 
stereotyped legal system. 216 Although Belgium certainly deserves a place among 
the world-leading countries with regard to the protection of trans rights, it 
missed the opportunity to fundamentally reform its sex/gender registration 
framework and shake o  lingering stereotypes concerning sex, gender and 
gender nonconformity. Protecting trans rights thus very much remains a work 
in progress, as evidenced by the Constitutional Court ’ s 2019 ruling. Indeed, 
as Levasseur holds, the law must allow for the full range of human variation 
and must refrain from privileging certain identities over others by enforcing a 
cisgender and binary standard as the norm. 217 
 
 216  See in this regard also  E.  Bribosia ,  N.  Gallus and  I.  Rorive ,  ‘ Une nouvelle loi pour les 
personnes transgenres en Belgique [A new law for transgender persons in Belgium] ’ ( 2018 ) 
 137  Journal des Tribunaux ,  261 , 266. 
 217  M.D.  Levasseur ,  ‘ Gender Identity De& nes Sex: Updating the Law to Re< ect Modern Medical 
Science is Key to Transgender Rights ’ ( 2014 – 2015 )  39  Vermont Law Review ,  943 , 999. 
